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Disclosure of Non-Public Transmission Function Information

Disclosure of Non-Public Transmission Function Information


SCE is disclosing the information presented on this page in accordance with the Standards of Conduct. SCE makes no warranties regarding the accuracy of the information presented on this page.

Class name
heading-new-style sce-para-first-top
Expose as Block
No

09/26/19

On Thursday, September 26, 2019, an SCE Transmission Function Employee inadvertently provided non-public transmission function information regarding the clearance on the Live Oak-Weymouth 66 kV Line to a group of Marketing Function Employees via SCE’s internal radio system.

08/06/18

On Saturday, August 4, 2018, the following Non-Public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to SCE Marketing Function Employees:

The Big Creek Rector 220 line failed around 1:45 am.

Big Creek staff are working on-site to get the 220-line restored.

The cause of the failure is currently unknown.

05/11/17

On Tuesday, May 10, 2017, SCE’s Grid Control Center’s daily status report from May 3, 2017, which included non-public transmission function information was inadvertently emailed to an SCE Marketing Function Employee.

07/22/16

On Tuesday, July 19, 2016, Non-Public Transmission of Customer Information was inadvertently delivered to SCE's internal Marketing Function Employees regarding customer billing account information.

06/09/14

On Thursday, June 5, 2014, the following Non-Public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to an SCE Marketing Function Employee: 1740 06/04/2014 Mayberry-Nelson 115 kV Line in after replacing line potential transformer at Nelson Sub. Had been out since 06/03/14.

05/09/13

On Tuesday, May 7, 2013, the following Non- Public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to an SCE Marketing Function Employee:

  1. The Big Creek - Rector 220 KV Springville line was lost. This line was coincident with the 04:06 loss of the Eastwood pump storage unit
  2. Cause of outage (why the failed equipment or operation caused the unit to be derated or moved from service).

04/27/12

On Sunday, April 15, 2012, Non-Public Transmission of Customer Information related to payments owed under a Large Generation Interconnection Agreement was inadvertently delivered to SCE's internal Marketing Function Employees.

12/05/11

On Thursday, December 1, 2011, Non-Public Transmission Customer Information was inadvertently delivered to SCE's internal Marketing Function Employees regarding interconnection agreements.

06/27/11

On Monday, June 27, 2011, the following Non-public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to SCE Marketing Function Employees:

  1. Explanation of outage (unit tripped controls trouble, unit derated condenser cleaning, fire, operating error). Unit is being taken out of the schedule due to 220 KV line loading requirements.
  2. Description of equipment failure (specific equipment that failed).
    On 6/21/11 Thermo-vision camera scan revealed conductor had a severe temperature increase across the gunshot conductor on the Big Creek 3 - Rector 220 KV line
  3. Cause of outage (why the failed equipment or operation caused the unit to be derated or moved from service).
    The Big Creek 3 - Rector line has to be taken out of service for repairs resulting in limiting load and removing this generator from the schedule.
  4. Remedial Actions Taken (working to repair turbine stop valve, cleaned west half condenser, re-started unit after operating error).
    Repair/Replace damaged 220 KV conductor.

12/23/10

Between the dates of December 14 and December 20, 2010, certain e-mail communications were forwarded to Ron Litzinger, currently the Chairman and CEO of Edison Mission Group in anticipation of assuming his new duties as President of SCE on 01/01/2011. Several of these e-mail messages contained non-public utility information concerning: (i) the number of distribution customers affected by storms, (ii) damage to utility property, (iii) availability and agendas for upcoming meetings and conferences, (iv) request for donation by a non-profit foundation, and (v) one SCE department's budget status. No non-public transmission function information was disclosed.

09/02/10

On Thursday, September 2, 2010, the following Non-public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to SCE Marketing Function Employees:

PCI Outages: (Line #10314 & #10315) have been submitted for Center and Grapeland Peakers to conduct black start testing. Center will require one of the 66KV buses to be stripped and Grapeland will only need 66KV breaker CB-501 (Etiwanda-Ameron-Grapeland-Pipe) to be open.

Center to test on 09/14/10 starting at 0800 to 1159 and Grapeland, starting on 09/17/10 from 0800 to 1159 hrs. Please forward a switching order request to strip one of Centers 66kv busses north or south. Vista, Does CB 501 be open and requires a switching order to be submitted? If so, please do.

Cause code 9998 (black start testing) was not on the list and had to settle for cause code 9590.

06/11/10

On Thursday, June 10, 2010, the following Non-public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to SCE Marketing Function Employees

MAIN CITIES AFFECTED: Tehachapi, Caliente Cause: Skyline fell into the 66kV line out by Cal Cement - that line section out (windfarm line). Customer-owned subs have to be inspected and transmission has to be patrolled before they energize back so we can go back to normal. Vincent S/C is involved with coordinating these action items.

1st Relay:
TIME OFF: 06/10/2010 22:10
TIME LOAD STARTED TO BE RESTORED: 06/10/2010 22:10:30
TIME ALL LOAD RESTORED: 06/10/2010 22:10:30

2nd Relay:
TIME OFF: 06/10/2010 22:18
TIME LOAD STARTED TO BE RESTORED: 06/10/2010 22:28
Current Status
T/M restored all power to residential customers.

Northwind dead
Pinwheel and Gust CBs open

Midwind dead
Puff is being carried by the Keene. Tempest is still open.

Southwind dead

ESTIMATED TOTAL CUSTOMERS: 14,602 customers
TOTAL SUBSTATIONS: 8
TOTAL CIRCUITS: 17

SUBSTATIONS/CUSTOMER COUNT

Breeze 12kV Substation
Slump – 0 (Wind generation)
Slurry – 0 (Wind Generation)
Chinook – 3875
Sirocco – 1743

Loraine 12kV Substation
Zenda - 317

Walker Basin 12kV Substation
Rankin- 94

Havilah 66/12KV Substation
Flying D 12 KV – 437
Tee Vee 12 KV – 9

Cummings 12kV Substation
Caliente - 2148
Cuddeback - 3160
Mettler - 1946

Southwind 12kV Substation
Sancho - 1
Quixote - 0

Northwind 12kV Substation
Gust - 840
Pinwheel- 3

Midwind 12kV Substation
Tempest - 1
Puff - 28

01/16/09

On Friday, January 16, 2009, the following nonpublic transmission function information was improperly disclosed to SCE marketing function employees.

SCE Outage Request Item: VIS7128

Outage Date: 01/22/2009
Return Date: 01/22/2009
Substation: Grapeland
Voltage: 66
Equipment: Etiwanda-Ameron-Grapeland-Pipe 66 kV Line
Scheduled: Thu 0800-0900
Emer. Return: 15 min.

Outage Detail:

Etiwanda-Ameron-Pipe 66 kV CB bypassed
Trip test 66 kV CB via HCB relay

Grapeland Peaker unit unavailable for the duration

Etiwanda-Ameron-Grapeland-Pipe 66 kV Line HCB relay
previously nonautomatic VIS5317

Etiwanda Sub 7A Bank 220/66 kV cleared with Ameron
Sub being carried via Etiwanda-Grapeland-Pipe 66 kV
Line and Ameron furnace off VIS7070

08/11/08

Update: the information in the 8/08/08 posting below was sent to ES&M by a non-SCE-affiliated entity.

08/08/08

On Friday, August 8, 2008, the following nonpublic transmission information was improperly disclosed to employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management.

04/23/08

Last night [April 22, 2008] at approximately 4:38 PM MST, the 500/345kV bank in the Four Corners 500kV Switchyard experienced a failure of the transformer banks tertiary winding connections. The cause has not been determined at this time. Crews are currently disconnecting the three single-phase transformers that form this transformer bank. There is one single-phase spare transformer available for service. Oil samples are being collected for analysis. The transformers will be Dobled and SFRA tested sometime this evening.

If no more than one transformer is damaged, the transformer connections will be reinstalled, and the bank will be returned to service. This disconnecting, testing, reconnecting, and return to service could be completed within three to five days, depending on conditions found during the inspections and testing.

If more than one transformer is damaged, the Moenkopi Line will not be in service until Unit 5 is returned to service, on or about May 28th. The Moenkopi line can carry all of the 755 MW output of Unit 5.

04/07/08

On Monday, April 7, 2008, the following nonpublic transmission information was improperly disclosed to an employee of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management.

At the Scoping Meeting for the [redacted*] Phase 1 (TOT [redacted*]) and Phase 2 (TOT [redacted*]) [redacted*] determined that it would prefer to interconnect its Phase 1 Project to the Cottonwood-Savage 115 kV line. As a result, [redacted*] has elected to withdraw its TOT Application for interconnection with CAISO (TOT [redacted*]) and resubmit its WDAT Application for the same project (WDT [redacted*]) with SCE.

Please continue to use the existing Application Phase Work Order Number [redacted*] for WDT [redacted*]. If you have already incurred costs associated with TOT [redacted*], please apply these charges to the WDT [redacted*] WO Number.

* The redacted information contains confidential customer-related information.