SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY'S 2026 PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF ACTION PLAN

May 28, 2026

Table of Contents

I.

INTRODUCTION AND ACTION PLAN OVERVIEW

This 2026 PSPS Action Plan is a set of activities Southern California Edison Company (SCE) has identified to address concerns raised by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC or Commission) in a letter from then-President Alice Reynolds sent to SCE in October 2025.

A. Background

The threat of wildfires in California has increased in recent years due to several factors including weather and climate, land use and resource management policies, and human actions.[1] During extreme weather conditions, high winds can increase the risk of ignition caused by utility infrastructure due to issues such as broken cross arms or vegetation or other objects blowing into powerlines. These fires can then spread rapidly given the high winds and extremely dry conditions.

California investor-owned utilities (IOUs), including Southern California Edison Company (SCE), implement various measures to mitigate the risk of wildfires associated with electric facilities. These measures are described in the IOUs' Wildfire Mitigation Plans (WMPs). SCE's most recent WMP for 2026-2028 was approved by the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (Energy Safety) on February 23, 2026. SCE's WMP is aimed at hardening the grid to reduce wildfire risks (i.e., reducing the number of ignitions) and enhancing system resiliency (i.e., reducing electrical infrastructure damage and improving power restoration time during and after a fire event). Wildfire mitigation measures include, but are not limited to, replacing bare overhead conductor with overhead covered conductor or underground conductor, deploying Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiters (REFCL), enhancing vegetation management capabilities, and installing additional weather stations and high-definition cameras to improve situational awareness. SCE has made significant progress in hardening its grid and will continue to do so in the coming years.

---

1 https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/wildfires.

Despite the success of our grid hardening efforts, the risk of a wildfire caused by utility infrastructure will likely never be zero and SCE must sometimes exercise a proactive de-energization of power lines to reduce the risk of wildfires, referred to as Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS). PSPS is a necessary measure of last resort appropriately employed to protect public safety under extreme fire-risk weather conditions. The fundamental objectives of SCE's PSPS program are to protect public safety while striving to keep the power on for as many customers as possible; communicate clearly and accurately before, during, and after PSPS events; mitigate the impact of de-energization through customer programs; and restore service to de-energized customers as quickly and safely as possible. Since its implementation in 2018, SCE has continuously refined and evolved its PSPS program to accommodate both advancements in risk assessment and the needs of our customers.

From 2020 to 2023, the number of PSPS events in SCE's service area gradually decreased, going from 12 in 2020 to 8 in 2023. In 2024, there was an increase to 20 PSPS events followed by 14 events in 2025. From 2023 to 2025, due to the risks associated with an increasing number of extreme weather events, SCE de-energized a larger number of customers per PSPS event than in the prior years, including a significant number of de-energized customers in the two January 2025 events. In addition, the average number of days per PSPS activation has steadily increased each year since 2021. In recent years, SCE has used switches to increase the segmentation on its circuits so that fewer customers are typically de-energized on a circuit during a PSPS event than if the circuit did not have segmentation, which benefits customers on those circuits. However, other factors, including extreme weather events (especially in 2023 and 2025), improvements in our weather models, and – more recently – changes to de-energization thresholds to address increased risk have resulted in more PSPS events with de-energization in recent years, more customers de-energized per event, and longer durations for PSPS activations.

SCE understands that PSPS events – even when de-energization does not occur – can cause significant hardships for our customers and communities, and we continually try to strike the right balance between achieving acceptable levels of risk through grid hardening so that we can keep

customers energized, and reducing the risk of devastating wildfires by de-energizing customers when extreme weather conditions exist. We are aware of and share the concerns of our customers that experience PSPS. These concerns were highlighted in a letter from CPUC President Reynolds to SCE on October 3, 2025 (October Letter). In that letter, President Reynolds identified the following concerns about SCE's PSPS program in 2024 and 2025:[2]

- Scope and duration of de-energizations
- Implementation, outreach, and mitigation activities associated with changes to PSPS de-energization thresholds that went into effect in 2025
- PSPS notification processes

The October Letter also directed SCE to hold bi-weekly meetings with the CPUC and Energy Safety, and to invite the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire), to discuss these concerns, and for SCE to "demonstrate how it plans to create measurable improvements in the extent, scope, and duration of its PSPS events, as well as in the timeliness, accuracy, and effectiveness of its notifications."[3]

B. Bi-Weekly Meetings

The first of the bi-weekly meetings occurred on October 28, 2025.[4] In the first two meetings, SCE reviewed various aspects and statistics about its PSPS program. In the next two meetings, SCE presented draft action plan elements for feedback from the agencies. Following the fourth meeting, the CPUC sent feedback and recommendations to SCE via email and the parties reviewed and discussed the feedback in the fifth meeting. In the fifth meeting, the parties agreed that the next step would be for SCE to produce an action plan addressing the concerns in the October Letter.

---

2 October Letter, pp. 1-2.

3 *Id.*

4 There was a gap of approximately four weeks between the fourth meeting on December 19, 2025, and the fifth meeting on January 16, 2026, due to the year-end holidays.

C. Overview of SCE'S 2026 PSPS Action Plan

SCE continuously reviews and evaluates its PSPS program and makes improvements if we identify issues. The 2026 PSPS Action Plan addresses the concerns regarding SCE's PSPS program in 2024 and 2025 that were raised by the Commission in the October Letter and bi-weekly meetings. Our approach is to describe our general processes for addressing the concerns outlined in the October Letter as well as any new or enhanced measures we will implement to try to address those concerns for our customers. For each of the concerns, we have also identified metrics we use to assess whether our Action Plan is effective in reducing them.

To address the Commission's concerns, SCE will be implementing the following six new or enhanced actions:

1. Continue implementation of grid hardening measures to reduce scope, frequency, and duration of PSPS events and de-energizations in areas most impacted by PSPS events in 2025.
2. Continue improvements in weather forecasting to enhance situational awareness to inform PSPS decision-making to optimize PSPS scope and enable more timely notifications.
3. Deploy Gridscope and drone pilots to improve re-energization times, which can reduce duration of de-energizations.
4. Enhance outreach about critical PSPS information to communities and local governments.
5. Improve timeliness and accuracy of PSPS notifications by enhancing notifications system automation.
6. Improve accuracy of customer contact information to enable successful delivery of PSPS notifications.

These actions are described in more detail in Chapter II in the context of the concerns from the October Letter. SCE emphasizes that the factor with the largest impact on the number, scope, and duration of PSPS events and de-energizations is weather. However, SCE believes that under

similar weather conditions as those experienced in 2024 and 2025, the Action Plan will improve our customers' experiences in these areas of concern, as well as the timeliness of PSPS notifications.[5] Chapter III identifies key milestones SCE will use to track the implementation status of the actions.

This 2026 PSPS Action Plan is a "living document" in the sense that SCE anticipates we will learn things during implementation of the actions that may necessitate changes to the plan. For example, we may determine during or even after the implementation of an action that it is not having the intended effect on one of the concerns and we will need to modify the action or add a new one. In addition, new technologies or processes to address concerns may be developed that are not currently part of the plan.

SCE clarifies that all the activities that are currently part of this Action Plan will be achieved with existing authorized funding (or in the case of Action Item #3, shareholder funding). Nothing in this Action Plan or the Commission's input on the Action Plan will be interpreted as recommendation or approval for incremental funding. Any future incremental funding requests for actions to enhance SCE's PSPS program will be requested through appropriate funding request mechanisms, such as the General Rate Case (GRC).

Some key terms to understand for the action plan are "PSPS event," "Period of Concern" (POC), and "de-energization." *PSPS event* is the term for the overall operational episode during which SCE activates its PSPS protocol in response to forecasted or observed wildfire risk conditions. A *POC* is the forecasted time window during a PSPS event in which SCE determines that weather, fuel, and situational conditions could reasonably require power to be shutoff to reduce wildfire risk. A POC is identified in advance based on meteorological forecasts and field conditions and can change in time or duration during the PSPS event. *De-energization* is the intentional shutoff of electric power to one or more circuits as part of a PSPS event to reduce the risk of wildfire ignition from electrical equipment. A PSPS event can have a POC that does not ultimately have any

[5] As SCE continues to refine its PSPS program and protocols, we will assess the impacts of the Action Plan by looking at both actual results as well as backcast results that assess likely impact under prior weather conditions and FPI criteria to determine whether the actions are having the intended impacts.

actual shutoffs if conditions do not ultimately warrant de-energization. A PSPS event can also have more than one POC.

II.

SCE's Approach to Address Concerns with Its PSPS Program

The October Letter focused on the following concerns with SCE's PSPS events in 2024 and 2025:

- Number of PSPS events
- Scope of PSPS events
- Duration of PSPS events
- Communication of PSPS Impacts and Changes in PSPS Initiation Criteria
- Adequacy of PSPS Notifications

A. Number of PSPS Events and De-Energizations

This section addresses the CPUC's concern with the number of PSPS events and de-energizations as part of SCE's PSPS program in recent years. As explained above, after seeing a gradual decrease in the number of PSPS events per year, that number increased sharply in 2024 and stayed relatively high in 2025. While weather and fuel conditions are the primary drivers of the number of PSPS events, there are other factors that influence the number. The primary factor that can affect the number and frequency of PSPS events and de-energizations for a circuit segment is the PSPS thresholds for that segment – circuit segments with higher thresholds will experience fewer PSPS events and de-energizations than circuit segments with lower thresholds in the same weather conditions.

1. SCE's General Approach to Address Number of PSPS Events and De-Energizations

All circuits located within High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA) are subject to PSPS de-energizations when fire potential and windspeeds (sustained and gusts) are forecast to meet predefined thresholds. Due to variances in geography, fuel loading, weather patterns, and circuit configuration, certain circuits may reach those thresholds more frequently than others. PSPS remains SCE's wildfire mitigation measure of last resort. Accordingly, the most effective means of reducing the frequency and scope of PSPS events is to mitigate underlying wildfire risk through

infrastructure hardening and system improvements. Among the available wildfire mitigation strategies, hardening overhead electric infrastructure against wind-related hazards has proven to be the most effective and cost-efficient at reducing both wildfire ignition risk and the need for PSPS de-energization. SCE has been steadily implementing grid hardening measures in areas with the highest fire risk pursuant to our WMP. These highest risk areas generally correspond to the areas most frequently impacted by PSPS conditions, although this correlation does not apply in all cases.

PSPS de-energizations are executed by using grid sectionalization or isolation equipment (*i.e.*, remotely controlled switches, remote automatic reclosers, or circuit breakers). These devices create discrete, isolatable segments of a circuit that can be independently de-energized as extreme fire weather conditions propagate across SCE's service territory. In certain locations, the wildfire risk profile has already warranted hardening of an entire isolatable segment. In other cases, only portions of a segment or circuit have been hardened to date. SCE applies PSPS windspeed thresholds at the isolatable segment level. As a general practice, these thresholds are not raised until the entirety of an isolatable segment has been hardened, because partial hardening results in varying levels of vulnerability to wind-related damage across the segment.

To accelerate reduction in PSPS risk, SCE conducts an annual review of circuits that experienced the greatest PSPS impacts in the prior year. In this review, SCE identifies opportunities to advance or prioritize hardening work that may present relatively lower wildfire risk benefits in isolation but would result in the complete hardening of an isolatable segment or circuit. Completion of such work enables SCE to raise PSPS wind thresholds for the affected segment, thereby reducing the likelihood, duration, or scope of future PSPS events for customers on that segment. While SCE's grid hardening program is fundamentally prioritized based on wildfire ignition risk, execution challenges associated with certain higher risk projects may create opportunities to advance lower risk projects that result in meaningful PSPS reduction benefits. Absent this targeted review and reprioritization process, PSPS-affected circuits and isolatable segments would eventually be fully hardened, but the timeline for completion could extend several additional years.

2. SCE's New or Enhanced Efforts to Address the Number of PSPS Events and De-Energizations

Activity 1: Advance Grid Hardening for Most-Affected Circuits

In developing this Action Plan, SCE reviewed the grid hardening status and planned work for 22 circuits that experienced PSPS impacts more than once during 2025, excluding PSPS events that occurred in January.[6] For each circuit, SCE identified the remaining scope necessary to achieve full hardening of isolatable segments and then estimated the expected reduction in PSPS impacts that would result from post-hardening windspeed threshold adjustments.[7] These estimates were developed using approximately two years of circuit-specific weather data, covering the period from November 2023 through November 2025. This analysis allowed SCE to assess how historical PSPS conditions would have been affected had the planned hardening work already been completed and corresponding threshold adjustments been in effect. Table 1 shows the results for those 22 circuits.

Table 1. Estimated Windspeed Reduction Through Grid Hardening for 22 Circuits that Experienced High PSPS Impacts in 2025

Circuit	2025 PSPS Event Count (excl. Jan)	Max. Customers Affected in 2025	HFRA Circuit Length (miles)	Pending Hardening (miles / isolatable segments)	Planned Completion Date	Estimated Reduction in Windspeed Exceedance[8]

[6] SCE excluded the January 2025 windstorms from this analysis because they were anomalous in scope and severity, impacting a large percentage of all PSPS-eligible circuits, many of which are not likely to be considered frequently impacted by other metrics.

[7] Note that while SCE generally raises thresholds on circuit segments once they are fully hardened, there may be instances when even after SCE completes its hardening work, the PSPS thresholds cannot yet be increased for that segment. For example, if a section connects to a line owned by another entity and that entity's portion is not hardened, SCE may not deem the risk reduction sufficient to raise thresholds. If any such conditions are identified on the circuits in scope for this Action Plan, SCE will explain those in its status reporting.

[8] Estimated reduction calculated based on duration where wind speeds exceeded PSPS thresholds for 2-year period Nov 2023-Nov 2025, assuming a 15% discount from baseline criteria. Two years was chosen to give a relative estimate of the impact since actual yearly PSPS experience depends highly on observed weather conditions. SCE is looking into whether a longer time frame would be more appropriate. Analysis was performed when FPI 1.5 was in effect, though that FPI version does not directly affect the estimated windspeed reduction calculation. As SCE refines its PSPS protocols, SCE will perform similar analysis using the updated criteria.

BIRCHIM	6	579	51.4	16.1 / 5	6/30/2026	~70%
BLEDSOE	2	162	15.84	2.18 / 4	2/28/2027	~90%[9]
BONANZA	3	1269	37.4	0	Completed Oct. 2025	100%
CACHUMA	2	467	57.6	7.7 / 3	12/31/2027	~90%
CALGROVE	2	2	19.6	0.2 / 2	10/30/2026	0%
CLARINET	2	64	17.5	7.8 / 4	12/30/2027	~90%
DOBLE	5	2	13.2	13.2 / 1	12/31/2028	~80%
ENERGY	2	34	32.4	0	Completed Oct. 2024	0%
FIREBIRD	2	543	12.3	0.5 / 1	7/23/2026	~90%
FLYING D	2	333	58.2	0.4 / 2	12/31/2028	0%[10]
INTAKE	3	306	25.3	15.5 / 3	10/31/2027	~90%
JOHNSONDALE	3	11	2.7	0	No planned scope	~90%[11]
KINSEY	2	110	39.4	10.2 / 5	3/30/2028	~90%
NORTHPARK	3	587	26.4	6.9 / 4	12/31/2027	~70%
PENSTOCK	4	128	51.0	4.6 / 6	8/30/2027	~90%
RIDGE	2	373	18.2	3.34 / 3	8/29/2027	~90%
ROBINSON CREEK	2	238	16.1	12.1 / 2	3/27/2027	~60%
SCOUT	5	3	2.5	0	Fully underground	~80%[12]
TEE VEE	2	7	5.2	0	Completed May 2024	0%
TEJON	3	482	56.6	9.7 / 7	7/30/2027	~80%
TUBA	2	20	9.4	3.5 / 3	12/30/2026	~50%
TUNGSTEN	3	1645	41.7	4.2 / 6	8/31/2027	~90%[13]

[9] Switching and new WS have reduced likely PSPS scope from 162 to 24 customers until hardening complete.

[10] Hardening has reduced likely ongoing PSPS scope to from 333 to 30 customers.

[11] Downstream of INTAKE.

[12] Downstream of DOBLE.

[13] New switch and weather station installed in 2025 has reduced likely PSPS scope from 1,645 to 65 customers until hardening complete.

3. Metrics for Evaluating Effectiveness of Action Plan in Reducing Number of PSPS Events and De-Energizations

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Action Plan in reducing the number of PSPS events and de-energizations, SCE will assess the metrics in Table 2.[14] To support this evaluation, SCE has developed analytical tools that forecast and "backcast" PSPS impacts under varying assumptions related to weather conditions and windspeed thresholds. While real-time operational factors and field conditions introduce complexities that cannot be fully and accurately modeled, these tools provide a reasonable basis for estimating potential PSPS impacts that may have occurred under different infrastructure configurations. Although actual PSPS events in any given year are highly dependent on prevailing weather and vegetation conditions, SCE's analytical approach allows for a degree of normalization for weather and vegetation conditions across years, enabling more meaningful comparison of potential PSPS outcomes year over year. SCE cautions, however, that backcasting analyses are directional and not definitive. The ability to backcast depends on availability of the data necessary to complete a backcast. Given the system changes that have occurred over time (*e.g.*, circuit configurations, existence of weather stations, scoping for PSPS, data storage practices) the amount of time a backcast can go back depends on what aspects are being backcast. SCE is still determining how far it can backcast for this Action Plan and intends to go back to at least 2023 but will go back further where data permits. As SCE assesses future refinements of its PSPS protocols, SCE will report back any anticipated effects on this Action Plan.

Table 2. Metrics to Evaluate Reduction in Number of PSPS Events and De-energizations

Metric	How It Will Be Measured	Expected Outcome
Number of POCs for which a circuit segment that was identified for advanced or expedited hardening is in	SCE will compare the quantity of POCs for each circuit segment for the years prior to and after the hardening, back	Reduction in the number of POCs (when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, and FPI changes)

[14] Note that other changes envisioned in this Action Plan, such as updates to FPI protocols, may affect the usefulness of year over year comparisons. These impacts will be discussed, if applicable, in metrics reporting.

scope prior to and after the hardening.	to at least 2023. The comparison will include actual data and data based on backcasting.	
Number of times a circuit segment that was identified for advanced or expedited hardening is de-energized prior to and after the hardening.	SCE will compare the quantity of de-energizations for each circuit segment for the years prior to and after the hardening, including Customer Minutes Interrupted (CMI), back to at least 2023. The comparison will include actual data and data based on backcasting.	Reduction in the number of de-energizations (when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, and FPI changes)

SCE will evaluate actual data and, where feasible, backcast data because the backcast analysis would provide a more reliable comparison of whether the hardening work has an impact on PSPS when normalizing for weather, fuel conditions, and/or FPI. The actual data provides a holistic assessment so that SCE can evaluate whether additional mitigations should be considered.

B. Scope of PSPS Events and De-energizations

This section addresses the CPUC's concern with the scope of SCE's PSPS events and de-energizations in recent years. SCE interprets the "scope" of PSPS events to refer to both the number of circuit segments in scope for POCs and de-energizations and the number of customers in scope for POCs and de-energizations. From 2023 to 2025, due to the increasing risks associated with extreme weather events, SCE de-energized a larger number of customers per PSPS event than in the prior years, including a significant number of de-energized customers in the two January 2025 events. The number of circuit segments in scope for a POC is primarily driven by weather and the number of circuits exposed to a weather system. The more circuit segments affected by a wind event, especially in areas with unfavorable fuel conditions, the more segments that could be at risk of a PSPS. However, as explained in Section A above, a circuit segment's thresholds for de-energization affect when it is in scope for PSPS. So, if more circuit segments are hardened to a level where they have higher PSPS thresholds, it is possible that fewer circuit segments in an area will be

in scope for some weather events. This also directly affects the number of customers in scope for PSPS because that is based on how many customers are connected to each in-scope circuit segment.

1. SCE's General Approach to Address Scope of PSPS Events

SCE's primary method to address the scope of PSPS events is the grid hardening described in Section A. SCE conducts an annual review of circuits that experienced the greatest PSPS impacts in the prior year and identifies opportunities to advance or prioritize hardening work that completes hardening of an isolatable segment or circuit and enables SCE to raise PSPS wind thresholds for the affected segment. Raising the wind thresholds reduces the scope of future PSPS events for customers on that segment under similar weather conditions. Hardening work also includes the use of switches to increase segmentation on circuits so that fewer customers are typically de-energized on a circuit during a PSPS event than if the circuit did not have segmentation, which can reduce the scope of a PSPS event.

SCE also addresses the scope of PSPS events by optimizing its weather forecasting. SCE periodically expands, modernizes, and operationalizes its weather forecasting capabilities to provide earlier and more accurate predictions. These improvements are intended to enhance situational awareness, improve PSPS event scoping, support timely and accurate notifications, and reduce unnecessary PSPS impacts on customers while maintaining public safety. Weather forecasting is a foundational input to PSPS decision-making. Improvements in forecast lead time, spatial resolution, and probabilistic insight allow SCE to better anticipate evolving fire weather conditions and improve the timeliness and accuracy of PSPS event scoping.

Another way that SCE addresses scope of PSPS events is by optimizing assignments of weather stations to circuit segments so that the stations best reflect the conditions being experienced by the segment. For example, in 2026 SCE will perform a comprehensive proximity analysis for the entire population of circuits and weather stations. This analysis will assess whether weather stations mapped to circuits and circuit segments are within the appropriate proximity to effectively anticipate weather impacts for the circuit. Furthermore, if a circuit segment is assessed for PSPS consideration using data from a weather station that is close in proximity but at a

significantly higher elevation, SCE may assign a different weather station or add a new one. SCE did such reassignments in 2025 for the Bootlegger and Bonanza circuits, which resulted in reduced scope for some PSPS events. As of March 2026, SCE does not have any other specific weather station reassignments planned but reassesses weather station-to-circuit segment assignments when PSPS events are forecast to determine whether any additional reassignments are warranted.

2. SCE's New or Enhanced Efforts to Address Scope of PSPS Events

Action 1: Advance Hardening of Most Impacted Circuits (described in Section A) will also have an impact on PSPS scope. By hardening these circuit segments, for example by replacing bare conductor wire with covered conductor, SCE will be able to raise the PSPS wind speed thresholds for some of the circuit segments, which should decrease the scope of PSPS for wind events that affect these areas compared to events prior to the hardening completion. SCE will also aim to optimize PSPS scope using Action 2: Enhanced Weather Forecasting.

Action 2: Enhanced Weather Forecasting

Also in 2026, SCE will implement three weather forecasting enhancement initiatives: (i) extension of 1-kilometer (km) ensemble[15] forecasts from a four-day to a seven-day horizon, (ii) extension of ensemble-based machine learning forecasts[16] derived from the 1-km model suite to a seven-day horizon, and (iii) retraining and expansion of operational 1-km machine learning forecast systems. Together, these initiatives are designed to improve forecast accuracy, increase lead time for identifying potential PSPS conditions, and provide earlier insight into the range of plausible event scenarios. This will improve event scoping by giving forecasters more accurate, longer-range forecasts, allowing them to better identify circuits, and therefore customers, that have a reasonable chance of meeting PSPS criteria.

Extension of High-Resolution Forecast Lead Time

15 Ensemble forecasts are a collection of weather models run using different configurations or input conditions that sample various aspects of weather forecast uncertainty to provide a range of forecast outcomes.

16 Machine learning is a statistical artificial intelligence technique that derives relationships between a set of predictors and expected outcomes. In this case SCE's machine learning uses the ensemble weather forecasts as predictors trained on SCE's weather station network observations resulting in improved weather forecast accuracy.

SCE will extend its high-resolution (1-km) ensemble weather models from their current forecast range of approximately four days to up to seven days of lead time. This enhancement will allow SCE to identify potential wind-driven or fire-weather-related PSPS conditions earlier than is currently possible in its ensemble approach. Earlier recognition of potential PSPS conditions enables SCE to evaluate a broader range of potential event scenarios, particularly during the early stages of an event when forecast uncertainty is typically higher. Improved lead time supports more informed operational planning, earlier coordination with grid operations and field resources, and earlier engagement with customer teams and public safety partners. This enhanced situational awareness is expected to improve PSPS scoping decisions and notification timing.

Extension of Ensemble-Based Machine Learning Forecasts

SCE will extend all ensemble-based machine-learning forecasting systems driven by the 1-km model suite to a seven-day forecast horizon. Ensemble and machine learning forecasts provide probabilistic information critical for understanding forecast uncertainty and identifying divergent weather scenarios. By extending ensemble forecasts to seven days, SCE will be able to identify potential high impact, but lower probability, scenarios earlier in the forecast window. This probabilistic insight will support more proactive PSPS scoping, improved contingency planning, and earlier coordination across grid operations, business resiliency, and customer-facing teams. Enhanced ensemble forecasting also supports more informed decision making as forecasts converge closer to real-time conditions.

Retraining and Expansion of Machine Learning Forecast Systems

SCE will retrain all operational machine learning forecasting systems using 2025 observational data, including data from recent extreme weather events. By incorporating recent extreme conditions SCE will improve model performance during the high-risk periods most relevant to PSPS decision making. In addition, SCE will expand machine learning forecast coverage to additional forecast points across its service territory. By increasing spatial coverage SCE will improve forecast resolution in targeted PSPS prone areas and enhance accuracy at the local level, where PSPS scoping and threshold decisions are made.

Collectively, these forecasting enhancements are anticipated to provide SCE with earlier and more accurate insight into events as weather evolves, refinement of event scope as conditions change, and issuance of notifications to customers on circuits that have a reasonable chance of reaching de-energization criteria.

3. Metrics for Evaluating Effectiveness of Action Plan in Reducing Scope of PSPS Events and De-Energizations

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Action Plan in reducing the scope of PSPS events and de-energizations, SCE will assess the metrics in Table 3.[17]

Table 3. Metrics to Evaluate Reduction in Scope of PSPS Events and De-energizations

Metric	How It Will Be Measured	Expected Outcome
Number of circuit segments systemwide and for the 22 identified circuits in scope for each POC prior to and after the hardening.	SCE will compare the number of circuit segments in scope for each POC for the years prior to and after the hardening, back to at least 2023. The comparison will include actual data and data based on backcasting.	Reduction in the number of circuit segments per POC when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, FPI changes, and geography (i.e., we need to compare segments and customers in comparable geographic areas to assess effectiveness)
Number of customers systemwide and for the 22 identified circuits in scope for each POC prior to and after the hardening.	SCE will compare the number of customers in scope for each POC for the years prior to and after the hardening, back to at least 2023. The comparison will include actual data and data based on backcasting.	Reduction in the number of customers per POC when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, FPI changes, and geography (i.e., we need to compare segments and customers in comparable geographic areas to assess effectiveness)
Number of circuit segments systemwide and for the 22 identified circuits de-energized for each POC prior to and after the hardening.	SCE will compare the number of circuit segments de-energized for each POC for the years prior to and after the hardening, back to at least	Reduction in the number of circuit segments de-energized per POC when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, FPI changes, and geography (i.e.,

[17] Note that other changes envisioned in this Action Plan, such as updates to FPI protocols, may affect the usefulness of year over year comparisons. These impacts will be accounted for in backcasting analyses, where possible, and discussed in metrics reporting. SCE already backcasts for FPI but is still determining whether it can backcast for changes in weather forecasting.

	2023. The comparison will include actual data and data based on backcasting.	we need to compare segments and customers in comparable geographic areas to assess effectiveness)
Number of customers systemwide and for the 22 identified circuits de-energized each POC prior to and after the hardening.	SCE will compare the number of customers de-energized for each POC for the years prior to and after the hardening, back to at least 2023. The comparison will include actual data and data based on backcasting.	Reduction in the number of customers de-energized per POC when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, FPI changes, and geography (i.e., we need to compare segments and customers in comparable geographic areas to assess effectiveness)

SCE will evaluate both actual data and, where feasible, backcast data because the backcast analysis, while it has its limitations, provides a more reliable comparison of whether the hardening work has an impact on PSPS when normalizing for weather, fuel conditions, and/or FPI. The actual data provides a holistic assessment so that SCE can evaluate whether additional mitigations need to be considered.

Because actual PSPS outcomes in any given year remain dependent on prevailing weather and vegetation, SCE does not make a direct correlation between the weather forecasting enhancements and PSPS scope. However, SCE believes these improvements will likely enable SCE to more accurately determine which customers are in scope for a PSPS event and receive an advanced notification because we will have more forecast sources to consult towards the front-end of our activations (*i.e.*, the day we activate) rather than in the second or third forecast update.[18] SCE has included milestones in Chapter III to evaluate whether forecasting enhancements are contributing to improved PSPS scoping, notification timing, and overall situational awareness.

C. Duration of PSPS Events and De-Energizations

This section addresses the CPUC's concern with the duration of SCE's PSPS events and de-energizations in recent years. The average number of days per PSPS activation has steadily increased each year since 2021. In addition to extreme weather events (especially in 2023 and

[18] Note that SCE sends Advanced Notification to customers whenever there is a 25% or higher probability of them reaching PSPS criteria. Using a higher threshold would likely reduce "false positive" notifications (i.e., customers who get an advanced notification but then do not get de-energized) but also increase the number of missed notifications.

2025), several factors contribute to this increased duration, including improvements in our weather models and – more recently – changes to de-energization thresholds to address increased risk. Once a POC event begins, the duration of the event is driven by the weather and fuel conditions as well as the PSPS threshold levels for a given circuit or circuit segment. A circuit segment that is hardened to the point of having higher thresholds is likely to fall out of scope for a POC sooner than a segment with lower thresholds. When a circuit segment is de-energized as part of a PSPS event, it cannot be re-energized until the weather conditions that initiated the de-energization have subsided and until SCE has confirmed it is safe to re-energize the affected lines.

1. SCE's General Approach to Address Duration of PSPS Events

Similar to the number of PSPS events and the scope of PSPS events, SCE's primary way to address duration of POCs is through grid hardening as described in Section A, which can enable a circuit segment to fall out of scope sooner than if it is not hardened.

2. SCE's New or Enhanced Efforts to Address Duration of PSPS Events

Action 1: Advance Hardening of Most Impacted Circuits (described in Section A) will also have an impact on duration of PSPS events. By hardening the most impacted circuit segments, SCE will be able to raise the PSPS wind speed thresholds for some of the circuit segments. When circuit segments have higher thresholds, the weather conditions subside below those thresholds sooner, enabling to begin the re-energization process sooner, decreasing the event duration. SCE will also aim to optimize PSPS scope using Action 3: Technology Pilots for Assessing Lines for Re-Energization.

Action 3: Technology Pilots for Assessing Lines for Re-Energization

SCE has two new or enhanced activities it will use to try to reduce duration of PSPS events. The first is through expedited and advanced grid hardening as previously described, which has the potential to improve duration of POCs and de-energizations. The second is through two technology pilots that can improve the time in which SCE assesses whether a de-energized line can be safely re-energized, which can reduce the amount of time a de-energized customer is without

power, thus reducing the duration of a PSPS de-energization event. These two technologies are: (i) Gridware Gridscope devices, and (ii) Unmanned Aerial Systems (i.e., drones) Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operation. Both pilots are funded by SCE shareholders as part of the shareholder-funded safety measures requirement in SCE's 2021 Administrative Consent Order (ACO) and Agreement related to the 2017/2018 wildfires. No costs incremental to GRC authorized expenditures are anticipated for these pilot activities.

a) Gridscope Devices

A Gridscope device is a solar-powered, battery-enabled device equipped with multiple sensors to detect grid anomalies around distribution poles. It uses edge computing, mesh communications, and artificial intelligence (AI) to identify conditions that can lead to faults. Gridscope devices can be installed quickly, and because they operate independently of the grid and SCE communications, there is no interruption of service to install. The sensors include: vibrometer, accelerometer, inclinometer, electrometer, audible acoustic sensor, voltage gradient sensor, infrared sensor, ambient temperature sensor, barometer, particulate matter sensor, hygrometer, and a camera for situational awareness along the conductor span. A Gridscope device can detect multiple phenomena, including vegetation contact, line down, line slap, animal contact, equipment failure, structural damage, de-energization monitoring, protection operation, and micro-climate issues.

SCE's pilot began in late 2025 with a scope of 1,000 Gridscope devices – 990 were installed on circuits and 10 were held as replacements, if needed. The Gridscope devices were installed to cover targeted sections of the following five circuits: (i) Energy (16 kV), (ii) Cuthbert (16 kV), (iii) Haskell (16 kV), (iv) Ski (33 kV), and (v) Sand Canyon (16 kV). SCE selected these circuits for the pilot by assessing HFRA status, historic PSPS frequency, Worst Performing Circuits rankings,[19] communication studies, and comparison to other technologies being deployed (e.g., early fault detection (EFD), digital fault recorders (DFR), etc.). Specific poles were

[19] This is referring to Worst Performing Circuits in terms of reliability, not PSPS impacts.

selected for device installation based on pole loading studies, assessment of scheduled pole replacements, accessibility considerations, and land rights.

When a Gridscope device detects an issue, an alert is sent to SCE. For anything other than informational alerts, SCE will dispatch a troubleman to investigate the alert. The timing of dispatch depends on whether the alert is classified as an emergency or non-emergency. The troubleman then follows SCE's standard processes for resolving such issues. SCE received its first alert from a Gridscope device on December 3, 2025 – only two days after that device had been deployed.[20]

For PSPS events, on circuit segments with Gridscope devices deployed, SCE is evaluating whether troublemen will be able to use the data and camera views from the devices to determine when it is safe to re-energize the line. Because this information would be available to SCE more quickly than via a field visit to assess the circuit in person, if the evaluation proves successful there will be instances when customers are re-energized sooner than if there were no Gridscope devices on the circuit. Even in instances when the Gridscope information requires an in-person visit to the circuit to assess conditions, it will still likely allow for quicker re-energization because the troublemen will know the specific areas of concern on the circuit. During the pilot, if PSPS de-energizations occur on any of the five circuits with Gridscope devices deployed, SCE will assess re-energization times compared to re-energization times before the devices were deployed. However, if those circuits do not experience PSPS very much – or at all – in 2026, it is possible that we may not be able to assess the success of this technology in improving PSPS re-energization times until the Gridscope devices are deployed more broadly across SCE's service area.

In 2026, SCE will continue to assess the pilot devices and plans to deploy an additional 500 devices based on a combination of system risk, operational need, and lessons learned from prior deployments. All devices will be evaluated based on the following criteria: event accuracy (as confirmed by field personnel), location accuracy (confirmed by field personnel), alert

[20] That alert was for a broken guy wire (the lines remained energized). As of January 31, 2026, SCE's Gridscope devices detected a total of 15 alerts.

latency, and comparison of alerts against other sensors deployed in the same area. The planned addition of 500 devices this year is intended to broaden the diversity of data collected by expanding deployment across a wider range of circuit types. This may include subtransmission segments, more remote areas that require communication gateways, and circuits with historical data indicating events such as vegetation contact, animal contact, and high wind activity. Timing of the 500 installations is targeted for Q4, though attempts will be made to expedite as much as possible to Q3, as it is dependent on completion of planning activities, including proximity studies, communications assessments, pole loading analyses, and structure type evaluations. As part of the pilot assessment, SCE will also consider whether to expand the program after this year and whether to include transmission circuits.

b) Drone Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operation

Another way that SCE is seeking to improve re-energization times is through the use of unmanned aerial systems, or drones. Recent improvements in technology, and SCE's recently approved waiver from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for SCE personnel to operate the drones BVLOS, will enable SCE to use drones for patrols of circuits prior to re-energization. Previously, this use case was limited by both image quality/stability and the requirement that the drone pilot keep the aircraft within their visual line of sight. In hilly terrain, this made the drones much less efficient than simply driving along the circuit or using an SCE helicopter to perform the patrol. With the BVLOS waiver and new technology that allows the drones to capture high quality images/video in nighttime conditions, there will be many situations where the drone is the safest, fastest, and cheapest method of performing a patrol.[21] SCE is working to procure more drones and equip and train field personnel so that drones can make an impact on PSPS re-energization times as soon as the 2026 PSPS season. There are a small number of areas

[21] The drones are not able to operate in wind speeds above approximately 25 mph, but SCE does not generally patrol circuits until winds have subsided lower than that, so the potential gains from using drones in place of driving patrols still apply.

across SCE territory where drones may not currently be feasible due to FAA airspace restrictions or topography that blocks communication between the drone and controller.

Currently, SCE is training approximately 30 troublemen with FAA Part 107 licenses on nighttime and BVLOS operations. It is anticipated that these troublemen would be able to use drones to conduct and complement pre- and post-patrols before and during PSPS events. We are still in the process of assessing where the drones will be most effective for PSPS patrols, but testing-to-date indicates that this PSPS patrol option works reliably in most locations. SCE pilots are conducting test flights in some of the areas with topographical concerns to identify optimal launch / control locations in preparation for PSPS events. We are also working on a cellular network coverage map that will help define where BVLOS has the best chance of success.

SCE has also purchased five "drone-in-a-box" systems. A Drone-in-a-box is an autonomous drone system where the drone is permanently stored, charged, and protected inside a secure docking station ("the box") and can be deployed remotely without a pilot physically on site. This would enable potentially faster patrols because travel time would be unnecessary. SCE plans to place three of the initial drone-in-a-box systems at substations in areas with historically more frequent PSPS events.[22] While the main driver for this equipment is to pilot BVLOS capabilities for pre- and post-patrols during PSPS, SCE has identified several other use cases including, but not limited to, routine inspections, physical security patrols, asset inventory, and rapid outage response. Two of these drone-in-a-box solutions are currently installed on a temporary basis for training and testing purposes. The final pilot installations are planned to be completed in Q3 2026.

For 2026 PSPS events, once a de-energized circuit is cleared for patrol, SCE intends to use the drones piloted by troubleman to expedite patrols when the opportunity arises. As technology, regulation, and training advance to a sufficient level, SCE will begin using the drone-in-a-box solutions for PSPS patrols as well, though this may not occur until late 2026 or 2027. Even

[22] The other two drone-in-a-box systems will be deployed on Catalina Island (primarily to address use cases other than PSPS) due to the island's isolation and limited access to the interior, which make ground-based response and patrol times especially long.

in instances when the drone assessment reveals the need for repairs or a follow-up in-person, up-close equipment inspection the use of the drone will improve ultimate restoration times by allowing field resources to focus on the correct locations more quickly. SCE intends to track the usage of drones for PSPS patrols; however, it is possible that benefits will be minimal until more troublemen are trained and equipped with drones across more of SCE's service area. Like the Gridscope pilot, SCE's ability to assess the impact of the drone BVLOS pilot will depend on the number of times PSPS de-energizations occur in the areas where trained and equipped troublemen solutions are deployed. Efforts to deploy drones among troublemen assigned to areas frequently impacted by PSPS are underway and will continue through 2026.

3. Metrics for Evaluating Effectiveness of Action Plan in Reducing Duration of PSPS Events and De-Energizations

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Action Plan in reducing the duration of PSPS events and de-energizations, SCE will assess the metrics in Table 4.[23]

Table 4. Metrics to Evaluate Reduction in Duration of PSPS Events and De-energizations

Metric	How It Will Be Measured	Expected Outcome
Average days of duration per POC (for the 22 identified circuits) prior to and after the hardening work.	SCE will compare the average number of days for a POC affecting the 22 circuits identified for hardening for the years prior to and after the hardening, back to at least 2023.	Reduction in the number of days per POC (when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, and FPI changes).
Average hours of duration per de-energization (for the 22 identified circuits) prior to and after the hardening work.	SCE will compare the average number of hours for a de-energization affecting the 22 circuits identified for hardening for the years prior to and after the hardening,	Reduction in the number of hours per POC (when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, and FPI changes).

[23] Note that other changes envisioned in this Action Plan, such as updates to FPI protocols, may affect the usefulness of year over year comparisons. These impacts will be discussed, if applicable, in metrics reporting.

	including CMI, back to at least 2023.	
Average hours of duration per de-energization for circuit segments where Gridscope devices were used to determine safety for re-energization prior to and after implementation of the Gridscope devices.	SCE will compare the average number of hours for a de-energization for a circuit segment where Gridscope devices are used to assess ability to re-energize for the years prior to and after implementation of the devices, including CMI, back to at least 2023.	Reduction in the average number of hours per de-energization (when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, and FPI changes).
Average hours of duration per de-energization for circuit segments where drones with BVLOS authorization were used to determine safety for re-energization prior to and after implementation of the BVLOS drones.	SCE will compare the average number of hours for a de-energization for a circuit segment where BVLOS drones are used to assess ability to re-energize for the years prior to and after implementation of the devices, including CMI back to at least 2023.	Reduction in the average number of hours per de-energization (when normalized for weather, fuel conditions, and FPI changes).

During initial rollout of these technologies, there may not be a decrease in re-energization times because SCE will likely perform manual post-patrols to validate the Gridscope and drone assessments, so this assessment may not show improvements in re-energization times until future PSPS seasons. SCE is performing patrol validation testing for drones in winter and spring 2026 with the intent of being able to rely on drone patrols for the 2026 PSPS season.

D. Communication of PSPS Impacts and Changes in PSPS Initiation Criteria

This section addresses the Commission's concern with the effectiveness of SCE's communications to communities expected to be significantly impacted by PSPS – both before and during events – and communications about changes in PSPS initiation criteria. Some complaints from customers, community leaders, and local governments stem from the very nature of PSPS events. People do not like being told their power may be shut off proactively and they especially do not like actually being de-energized. SCE understands the hardships these scenarios cause for customers. The efforts mentioned in the preceding sections aim to address the concerns that often lead to general complaints. Beyond general complaints about PSPS, some complaints sent to SCE and the CPUC focus on more specific aspects of PSPS, such as whether there was sufficient

advance communication that a particular community might be exposed to more PSPS events due to forecast weather and/or changes in SCE's PSPS initiation criteria.

SCE is aware that some of the complaints the CPUC received from local government officials in 2025 pertained to lack of awareness or understanding of changes to SCE's FPI threshold for PSPS. FPI is a critical forecast metric that SCE monitors when determining whether PSPS de-energizations are necessary. High winds on their own can cause outages but are not enough to warrant a proactive power shutoff. While high winds can and do result in damage to overhead electrical infrastructure, which can result in sparks, most of the time those sparks have little to no potential to result in a catastrophic wildfire. However, when the high winds coincide with periods of low humidity and low moisture in vegetation, de-energization becomes necessary to eliminate the potential for those sparks. FPI factors in both fuel and weather conditions.

SCE's original FPI was based on SDG&E's FPI. SCE adopted it in 2018 and began using it for PSPS in 2019. SCE also added a fuel-loading modifier to account for areas where fuels are sparse and unlikely to support a significant fire. In 2021, SCE calibrated the index and was able to raise FPI thresholds across much of its HFRA as a result.

During 2025, primarily based on learnings from the January 2025 fires, SCE made additional refinements to its FPI. These refinements were implemented to account for additional wildfire risk factors. The changes addressed three key issues. First, they refined application of windspeed discount factors. Second, they shifted from the volatility of using real-time FPI calculated every 10 minutes to using the max of the highest FPI forecast over a 24-hour period or the real time calculated FPI. Finally, they allowed for reduction in FPI thresholds when multiple circuits were forecasted to meet PSPS criteria, which was noted as a key feature of days where prior large wind driven fires occurred.

SCE continues to review and refine its PSPS protocols. This includes backcasting analysis of the potential impacts of FPI changes using recent historical weather data. Once changes are made, the analysis and data will be used to develop targeted communications to key stakeholders, particularly targeting any communities expected to experience PSPS for the first time or at a higher

frequency than in prior years. These communications will also incorporate updates on the hardening activities underway in these communities (Action Plan Element 1) and expected PSPS benefits, including timing, the hardening activities will provide. While this is not a standalone action item for the Action Plan, communications about FPI changes and any potential impacts will be incorporated into the communication efforts discussed in subsections 1 and 2 below.

1. SCE's General Approach to Address Issues Related to Communicating Impacts of PSPS and Changes in PSPS Initiation Criteria

Each wildfire season, SCE provides proactive and sustained outreach to local and tribal government and community stakeholders. These outreach efforts are intended to enhance community awareness and resiliency in advance of the upcoming wildfire season and maintain readiness and coordination between SCE and impacted city, county, and tribal governments and the communities they represent. Broad communication and targeted outreach provide communities with any updates to: PSPS customer notification processes, customer support programs, PSPS operations, and PSPS decision-making criteria. SCE briefs all impacted HFRA communities in advance of the wildfire season. These efforts increased significantly in 2025 to include additional government briefings, community meetings and town hall events, resiliency workshops, and in-event communication. SCE also uses the PSPS Working Group and Advisory Board forums to discuss best management practices, share information, and receive meaningful feedback from local and tribal government officials.

It is critical that SCE conduct this outreach every year not only to update communities on changes to PSPS, but also because of the high turnover of elected government and tribal officials through election cycles. Moreover, local and tribal officials manage a wide range of responsibilities and competing priorities, which can limit sustained focus on any single issue like PSPS without sustained annual reinforcement through meetings, briefings, and presentations.

The targeted outreach prioritizes circuits and communities that may be newly subject to PSPS or that may be subject to multiple PSPS events. Preparatory activities include updates to SCE's PSPS Resource Guide for Local and Tribal Government, distribution of SCE's WMP,

County Progress Reports, new Grid Hardening Progress mapping tool, and distribution of any relevant resources such as PSPS fact sheets, customer newsletters, and customer support programs. These efforts are intended to improve understanding of PSPS operations included in this action plan, bolster situational awareness, and better support informed decision-making before, during, and after a PSPS event.

SCE recognizes that individual and community preparedness is a critical complement to SCE's wildfire mitigation and public safety efforts. Therefore, we also use these engagement opportunities to encourage stakeholders and the broader public to take proactive steps to strengthen their own readiness and resiliency during PSPS or emergency situations such as having an outage plan, staying informed through SCE notifications, preparing emergency and backup power resources, and considering the needs of family members, neighbors, or customers with access and functional needs.

To further inform customers and communities about PSPS and emergency preparedness – including customers that do not participate in community meetings – SCE uses a proactive and coordinated communications strategy designed for broad awareness and engagement. This approach features tailored messaging throughout the year, ensuring customers are regularly updated on program developments and receive timely preparedness information before and during PSPS events. Communications are delivered across multiple channels, including targeted emails and postcards, which will highlight resources for customers with access and functional needs. Additionally, outreach will be conducted via social media platforms such as Nextdoor, and our digital properties such as sce.com/psps will provide informative and relevant content, complemented by a comprehensive advertising campaign using out-of-home ads, digital ads, radio spots and other non-traditional out-of-home channels.

2. SCE's New or Enhanced Efforts to Address Issues Related to Communicating Impacts of PSPS and Changes in PSPS Initiation Criteria

Action 4: Enhanced Outreach about Critical PSPS Information to Communities and Local Governments

In 2026, SCE's community outreach strategy will increase engagement through virtual community meetings to maximize participation. The virtual community meetings we hosted in 2025 attracted significantly more participants than in-person meetings in PSPS-impacted communities. From June through October 2025, SCE convened over a dozen wildfire safety community meetings throughout the service area. The strictly in-person community meetings we hosted collectively drew approximately 120 attendees, while the strictly virtual community meetings achieved substantially higher participation - over 700 attendees. We believe the virtual format lowers barriers to participation, increases accessibility, and enables broader engagement by eliminating common participation barriers such as transportation, work and family commitments, and other customer obligations. The virtual and in-person community meetings are open to elected officials, government staff, community-based organizations (CBOs), and the public. To enhance responsiveness, SCE will continue to rapidly convene community meetings when requested by local officials, such as those hosted for Kern County, Mono County, Acton, Triunfo/Lobo Canyon, and Lake Hudges in 2025 or when PSPS impacts warrant additional engagement.

In addition, when SCE forecasts a PSPS POC, our Local Public Affairs organization will send an additional e-mail communication to local and tribal government elected officials. This additional point of contact is intended to ensure cohesion between local offices of emergency services, SCE's Incident Management Team (IMT), and elected officials in impacted communities. This additional touchpoint will include resources and reminders on how to access Public Safety Partner tools, how to communicate with SCE's IMT, and where to direct customers for more information about SCE's PSPS program, decision-making process, restoration policy, notifications, and customer programs. While local and tribal officials receive formal PSPS notifications containing information on POC, helpful points of contact during PSPS events, and available resources, we have received feedback that the volume of notifications they receive can make it difficult to track and prioritize this information. In response, we are operationalizing a proven best practice already used by some colleagues that has received positive feedback. Specifically, we are standardizing this additional touchpoint email template to be sent by each community's assigned

Government Relations Manager. This additional touchpoint is intended to cut through notification fatigue and draw greater attention to critical information during a PSPS event. It is important to underscore that in addition to this touchpoint, Government Relations Managers are frequently in contact with local and tribal officials as well as government staff throughout the duration of PSPS events to address their questions, concerns, or requests in coordination with our IMT(s).

Finally, following the January 2025 PSPS events, SCE's Business Resiliency team identified the need for enhanced communication strategies with local, state, and federal stakeholders during widespread emergencies and large-scale or prolonged PSPS events. These strategies include, but are not limited to, periodic in-event conference calls with elected officials across the service area to provide greater situational awareness and opportunities for real-time Q&A. These calls will supplement the daily coordination calls already held with county emergency managers and critical infrastructure partners during PSPS IMT activations. When feasible, this expanded communication cadence will begin ahead of anticipated incidents such as snowstorms, windstorms, or PSPS events.

3. Metrics for Evaluating Effectiveness of Action Plan in Improving Communications about PSPS Impacts and Changes in Initiation Criteria

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Action Plan in addressing issues related to PSPS impacts and changes in PSPS initiation criteria, SCE will assess the metrics in Table 5.

Table 5. Metrics to Evaluate Improvements in PSPS-related Communications

Metric	How It Will Be Measured	Expected Outcome
Number of attendees at community meetings (in-person and virtual)	Count of attendees	By offering more virtual meetings, SCE expects to see higher attendance as compared to prior years. While this does not guarantee greater awareness and understanding by communities, it does help SCE understand the level of engagement and whether other

		strategies need to be considered.
Qualitative assessment of resolution of formal complaints escalated to SED	SCE will communicate how it is tracking, researching, and addressing any complaint passed from SED to SCE about PSPS.	Visibility for SED and other agencies into how SCE addressed complaints and incorporates lessons learned, if applicable

E. Adequacy of PSPS Notifications

This section addresses the Commission's concern with the adequacy of SCE's PSPS notifications. The Commission has established required timeframes in which a utility must send certain notifications about a PSPS event (*e.g.*, advanced notification, imminent notification) prior to the start of a POC. In the October Letter, the Commission expressed concern about "the adequacy of SCE's notification processes."[24] SCE acknowledges that it has had issues with the number of missed PSPS notifications in recent years. A PSPS notification is generally missed (*i.e.*, either not sent within the required timeframe or not sent) due to one of the following reasons:

- *Sudden Onset of Weather:* Stronger-than-expected winds necessitate a de-energization for a circuit that had not been anticipated to exceed de-energization thresholds.
- *Circuit Not Forecast Early Enough to Meet Window:* Stronger-than-expected winds necessitate a circuit being added to the scope of a POC after the POC began (and therefore may not have gotten the Advanced Notification in the required timeframe).
- *Missing/Inaccurate Contact Information:* SCE either does not have contact information for a customer or the information we have is not correct.
- *Customer Move-ins/Move-outs:* If a customer is moving in or out of their premises during a POC, they may not receive notifications.
- *Other:* Notification missed due to other reasons, including operational issues.

SCE recognizes that accurate and timely PSPS notifications are a critical component for customers and public safety coordination, and SCE remains committed to continuous improvement

[24] October Letter, p. 1.

in PSPS notification performance. While notification performance is directly influenced by the accuracy of weather forecasting, real-time field observations, and changes to grid conditions resulting from evolving fire weather threats and operational constraints, SCE makes every effort to provide advanced and accurate notifications to Public Safety Partners, critical infrastructure facilities, and customers potentially affected by de-energization events.

Accurate customer contact information is essential to successful PSPS notifications. Even when notifications are generated and delivered in accordance with applicable timing requirements, notifications may not reach the intended recipient if customer information is missing, outdated, or misdirected. While incorrect or missing customer contact information is not a primary driver of missed notifications, it remains a contributing factor. These circumstances may arise when customers do not update their contact information following changes in phone number, email address, or account ownership, or when emergency notifications are directed to organizational or administrative contacts rather than on-site personnel (e.g., school district offices instead of individual school contacts).

In addition, some customers have valid contact information on file, but do not receive or act upon notifications in a timely manner due to their selected notification channel preferences (*e.g.*, delayed review of emails or unanswered phone calls). These factors, while often outside the utility's control, can affect customer awareness during PSPS events.

1. SCE's General Approach to Address Adequacy of PSPS Notifications

After each PSPS event, SCE analyzes missed notifications to determine the causes of the misses. SCE also performs evaluations of its notification performance during and after each PSPS season to determine whether any changes can be implemented in advance of the next season that have the potential to improve notification performance.

In terms of accuracy of notifications, SCE is aware that the CPUC has noted some customer complaints about power still being off several hours after an estimated restoration time in a notification. SCE does not provide a specific restoration time in its PSPS notifications. Instead, it communicates the restoration time as a range following the conclusion of the POC (*i.e.*, Prep

Restore notification). An example is, *"Winds have died down and we are starting to inspect our lines for damage. Restoration is expected to take up to 8 hours but could take longer if we need daylight for safe inspections or find damage."*[25] During restoration activities, SCE performs patrols across all de-energized circuits. These patrols can include air, truck, or foot patrols and can be affected by daylight and resource availability and may be additionally delayed if SCE finds damage or hazards during patrol. For these reasons, SCE does not communicate a specific estimated restoration time for PSPS restorations.

SCE has researched the timing between the PSPS Prep Restore notifications and the notifications communicating that power has been restored (*i.e.*, Restore notifications). SCE has determined that most events had an average delta of fewer than 6 hours between these notifications. For cases where the duration exceeded 8 hours, the most common cause is related to the inability to patrol safely for some circuits during non-daylight hours. To remove some confusion, SCE has modified its notification procedures to consider the likelihood of completing patrols and restoration later into the evening hours and will send Prep Restore notifications to customers only when there is a high chance of success. This will alleviate most future extended lead times between Prep Restore and Restore notifications, which could lead to reduced customer confusion.

Another recent update SCE made pertains to validating institutional customer contacts. Through the bi-weekly meetings that originated from the October Letter, Cal Fire made SCE aware of instances where emergency PSPS notifications were going to district-level officials rather than contacts at the school(s) in scope for the PSPS event. To address this issue, SCE conducted targeted outreach to schools in PSPS-impacted areas to provide site-specific emergency contacts the opportunity to enroll in outage notifications so that those notifications will go to a contact affiliated with the affected school rather than solely to district-level officials.

---

[25] In cases where customers expressed dissatisfaction after an estimated restoration time (ERT) passed without power being restored, the outage likely originated as a repair outage—where specific ERTs are provided—within an area also under an active PSPS event. During PSPS events, restoration of non-PSPS outages is subject to Incident Commander discretion, which may have delayed restoration beyond the original ERT.

2. SCE's New or Enhanced Efforts to Adequacy of PSPS Notifications

SCE will use two new actions to improve the adequacy of its PSPS notifications.

Action 5: Enhanced PSPS Notification Automation

In 2026, SCE will implement enhanced automation capabilities within its PSPS notification systems. These improvements are designed to streamline notification workflows, reduce manual review and authorization steps, and minimize delays between PSPS decision points and notification issuance. Key components of this effort include:

- *Increased Automation of Notification Approval Processes:* SCE will reduce manual intervention in the review and authorization of PSPS notifications, enabling faster execution once PSPS conditions are identified and decisions are made.
- *Single Action Notification Approval Capability:* SCE will implement a single approval feature that initiates notifications to both Public Safety Partners and customers through unified action. This enhancement is intended to improve coordination, reduce the risk of sequencing delays, and support consistent delivery across notification audiences.
- *Enhanced Notification Recommendation Logic:* In January 2026, SCE deployed notification system enhancements focused on improving the accuracy and granularity of notification recommendations, supporting more precise identification of impacted Public Safety Partners and customers as grid conditions evolve.
- *Expanded ability to segment notification failure causes:* SCE will add system logic to expand its categories for causes of missed notifications. New categories are: Emergent Weather, Move-In/Out, No Contact Data, and Notification System Failure.

Collectively, these system enhancements are intended to improve notification timeliness, reduce the likelihood of missed notifications attributable to manual processing delays, enhance awareness for customers and Public Safety Partners during PSPS events, and facilitate more effective corrective action analysis when missed notifications do occur.

Action 6: Improve Accuracy of Customer Contact Information and Emergency Preferences

To address these challenges and improve overall notification reach, SCE is implementing targeted actions during 2025-2026 to improve the completeness, accuracy, and usability of customer information, particularly for emergency communications. SCE's efforts to improve customer contact information include the following actions:

- *Expanded Enrollment in Emergency Notification Preferences:* SCE will continue to enroll customers in "Emergency" outage notification emails and has recently begun enrolling customers in secondary SMS notifications. These efforts are intended to increase the likelihood that customers receive time-sensitive communication through multiple channels. SCE began enrolling customers in SMS notifications for emergency (PSPS) and outage (maintenance and repair) events in Q4 2025. Since implementation, customer outage survey data shows a significant reduction in reports of missed notifications. In addition, Assembly Bill 1410 requires automatic enrollment in service outage and update alerts under an opt-out model, recognizing opt-in systems as a barrier to effective emergency communication—particularly for vulnerable populations. Automatic enrollment reduces reliance on customers to take proactive action and strengthens PSPS communications by ensuring customers are reachable by default.
- *Outreach to Medical Baseline and Self-Certified customers for emergency notification preferences:* SCE recently implemented a new monthly process to identify Medical Baseline (MBL) and self-certified customers without emergency notification contacts and preferences. Customer records are reviewed to locate available contact information and enroll eligible customers in notifications. When no contact data is found, a direct mailer is sent to inform customers and encourage them to update their contact and notification preferences.
- *Targeted Email Campaign to Address Missing Contact Information:* SCE executed a targeted email campaign pilot to obtain or validate email addresses for customers who currently lack contact information on record (i.e., approximately 8,000 out of 90,000 provided consent/confirmation). This campaign pilot in 2025 was designed to obtain customer consent and

confirmation while improving the completeness of contact records and was deemed successful. Additional pilot campaigns will be developed in 2026 to support email and SMS sourcing, validation, and customer consent for enrollment in emergency outage notifications.

Collectively, these actions are intended to reduce the volume of notifications that are properly sent but fail to reach the appropriate recipient due to contact information limitations (~1% of missed notifications), thereby supporting improved awareness during PSPS events.

3. Metrics for Evaluating Effectiveness of Action Plan in Improving Adequacy of PSPS Notifications

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Action Plan in improving its PSPS notification processes, SCE will assess the metrics in Table 6.

Table 6. Metrics to Evaluate Improvements in PSPS Notifications

Metric	How It Will Be Measured	Expected Outcome
Percentage of required notifications for a PSPS event that are missed	Comparison of PSPS Post-Event Report (PER) missed notification metrics before and after implementation of automation enhancements	SCE expects that for each PSPS event, the automation improvements will result in fewer missed notifications as a percentage of overall notifications required for the event.
Improved timeliness of notification issuance	Review of PER timing metrics to assess latency between PSPS decision points and notification delivery	Improves timeliness of notifications, a core concern in the October Letter
Improved transparency into notification failures	Availability and use of expanded categories for Missed Notifications in PERs (e.g., Emergent Weather, Move-In/Out, No Contact Data, and Notification System Failure)	Enables clearer identification of root causes, which can increase opportunities for targeted corrective actions
2026 PSPS customer satisfaction on accuracy and effectiveness of PSPS notifications	PSPS Voice of the Customer (VOC) survey data	SCE expects to see a smaller percentage of VOC responses expressing dissatisfaction with

		PSPS Notification accuracy and effectiveness.
Percentage of missed notifications due to missing or incorrect customer contact data	Review of PSPS PER missed notification data	SCE expects that improved accuracy in customer contact information will reduce the percentage of missed notifications in a POC due to missing or incorrect customer contact information.

While customer behavior and channel responsiveness remain factors outside the utility's direct control, these measures will enable SCE to evaluate whether its efforts are improving the reliability and effectiveness of PSPS communications measured through customer feedback on clarity, accuracy, and timeliness by addressing preventable data quality limitations.

III.

IMPLEMENTATION MILESTONES

In its progress reporting, which is explained in Chapter IV, SCE will track progress against the implementation milestones identified for each of the seven key actions as shown in Table 7. The table currently includes dates in 2026 only. Dates beyond 2026 will be added toward the end of 2026.

Table 7. SCE PSPS Action Plan Milestones

Milestone	Description	Anticipated Completion Date
Action 1: Advanced and Expedited Grid Hardening		
Complete hardening of Birchim Circuit	Covered conductor	June 30, 2026
Complete hardening of Calgrove Circuit	Covered conductor	October 30, 2026
Complete hardening of Firebird Circuit	Covered conductor	July 23, 2026
Complete hardening of Tuba Circuit	Covered conductor	December 30, 2026
Action 2: Enhanced Weather Forecasting		
Machine learning retraining and expansion verification	Case-study verification report on new machine learning weather forecasts is available.	July 31, 2026
Implement new machine learning weather forecast models	Machine learning weather forecast models leveraging the 2026 retraining effort are operational for use in PSPS scoping decisions. New machine learning forecast locations are available in the output.	August 31, 2026
Extend ensemble weather forecast horizon	Weather forecasts from SCE's 1-km weather model forecast systems extend to a forecast horizon of 7 days.	November 2, 2026
Quarterly model verification reports	Quarterly reports that assess forecast accuracy, reliability, and consistency over time, including during PSPS-relevant weather conditions.	April 2026 (Q1) July 2026 (Q2) October 2026 (Q3)[26]
Action 3: Technology Pilots for Assessing Lines for Re-Energization		

[26] In Q1 2027, SCE will complete an annual report for 2026 in Q1 2027.

Milestone	Description	Anticipated Completion Date
Install ~500 Gridscope devices	Deploy an additional 500 Gridscope devices to evaluate additional use cases this year.[27]	Q4 2026
Install drone-in-a-box pilot units	Complete deployment of five drone-in-a-box units.	Q4 2026
Action 4: Communicating Critical PSPS Information to Communities and Local Governments		
Complete Pre-Season Community Meetings and Outreach	Engage 95% of city, county, and tribal governments in HFRA on PSPS operations, decision-making processes, re-energization processes, customer programs, and wildfire mitigation strategies (covered conductor, TUG, etc.).[28] Include specific communication about FPI changes.	June 30, 2026
Implement process for extra in-event communication to government officials	Implement process for additional in-event communication[29] with local and tribal government officials. (i.e., When SCE forecasts a POC, Local Public Affairs will send proactive communications to local and tribal government elected officials to ensure cohesion between local offices of emergency services, SCE's IMT, and elected representatives in impacted communities.	April 2026 (Q2)
Action 5: Enhanced PSPS Notification Automation		
Implement enhanced granularity of notification failure reasons	System logic that will enable SCE to provide more specific reasons for missed notifications instead of 'Missing Authorized Campaign': • Emergent Weather • Move-In/Out • No Contact Data • Notification System Failure	June 30, 2026
Implement Notification Automation Enhancements	This enhancement streamlines authorization of notifications by reducing manual approvals, enabling faster pre-event and in-event communications to customers and Public Safety Partners.	June 30, 2026

27 These additional 500 devices would be paid for with shareholder funding as part of the 2021 ACO.

28 Engagement will occur through briefings, meetings, and/or presentations. Supporting materials will include PSPS Resource Guide, WMP, County Progress Report, Grid-Hardening Progress mapping tool, PSPS factsheets and resource materials.

29 This additional communication will include resources and reminders on how to access Public Safety Partner tools, how to communicate with SCE's IMT, and where to direct customers for more information about SCE's PSPS program, decision-making process, restoration policy, notifications, and customer programs.

Milestone	Description	Anticipated Completion Date
Action 6: Improve Accuracy of Customer Contact Information and Emergency Preferences		
Complete internal data validation of existing contact data	Complete data validation of accounts with existing mobile numbers and enroll in emergency outage notifications	March 31, 2026
Customers to confirm contact data	Execute email campaigns for accounts where validation failed, requesting customer feedback	June 30, 2026
Source new contact data	Leverage third-party data to source new mobile numbers and email customers to validate and provide permission for outage SMS notification[30]	June 30, 2026
Enroll MBL/Self-Certified Emergency Contacts and Preferences	On a monthly basis, create a report identifying missing enrollments and coordinate efforts to locate and enroll contact information for MBL and Self-Certified customers.	December 31, 2026

[30] SCE will aim to achieve similar results or better as it did in the pilot described in Section E.2.

IV.

PROGRESS AND EFFECTIVENESS REPORTING

SCE will produce an Action Plan Implementation Status Report on its website to provide updates on completion of the milestones included in Table 7 for 2026 and any additional milestones added in 2027 or 2028. SCE will post the first Status Report on June 30, 2026, and then at the end of each quarter thereafter during the implementation of this Action Plan. The latest known milestone for implementation is December 31, 2028 (hardening of some of the most-impacted circuits), and therefore SCE will produce its quarterly implementation report through the end of 2028.

To report on the effectiveness of the Action Plan in addressing the concerns raised in the October Letter, SCE will produce an annual Action Plan Review at the end of each PSPS season to provide updates on the metrics described in the tables in Chapter II and an assessment of the overall impact of the Action Plan on the concerns. The overall impact will include system-wide metrics such as: (i) number of PSPS events, (ii) number of PSPS events with de-energization, (iii) number of customers in scope per PSPS event, (iv) number of customers de-energized per event, (v) average duration of PSPS event, and (vi) average duration of de-energization. Reporting will include identification of any notable differences in weather between years. This report will be posted by March 31 of each year beginning in 2027 and going through 2029 or the final year following implementation of all actions in the plan.