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Regulatory Information - FERC Standards of Conduct

Disclosure of Non-Public Information


SCE is disclosing the information presented on this page in accordance with the Standards of Conduct. SCE makes no warranties regarding the accuracy of the information presented on this page.

12/5/2011

On Thursday December 1, 2011 Non-Public Transmission Customer Information was inadvertently delivered to SCE's internal Marketing Function Employees regarding interconnection agreements.

6/27/2011

On Monday June 27th , the following Non public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to SCE Marketing Function Employees:

  1. Explanation of outage (unit tripped controls trouble, unit derated condenser cleaning, fire, operating error).
    Unit is being taken out of the schedule do to 220 KV line loading requirements.
  2. Description of equipment failure (specific equipment that failed).
    On 6/21/11 Thermo-vision camera scan revealed conductor has severe temperature increase across gunshot conductor on the Big Creek 3 - Rector 220 KV line
  3. Cause of outage (why the failed equipment or operation caused the unit to be derated or moved from service).
    The Big Creek 3 - Rector line has to be taken out of service for repairs resulting in limiting load and removing this generator from the schedule.
  4. Remedial Actions Taken (working to repair turbine stop valve, cleaned west half condenser, re started unit after operating error).
    Repair/Replace damaged 220 KV conductor.

12/23/2010

Between the dates of December 14 and December 20, 2010, certain e-mail communications were forwarded to Ron Litzinger, currently the Chairman and CEO of Edison Mission Group in anticipation of assuming his new duties as President of SCE on 1/1/2011. Several of these e-mail messages contained non-public utility information concerning: (i) the number of distribution customers affected by storms, (ii) damage to utility property, (iii) availability and agendas for upcoming meetings and conference, (iv) request for donation by a non-profit foundation, and (v) one SCE department's budget status. No non-public transmission function information was disclosed.

9/2/2010

On Thursday September 2, 2010, the following Non-public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to SCE Marketing Function Employees:

PCI Outages: (Line #10314 & #10315) have been submitted for Center and GrapeLand Peakers to conduct black start testing. Center will require one of the 66KV buses to be stripped and Grapeland will only need 66KV breaker CB-501 (Ettiwand-Ameron-Grapeland-Pipe) to be open.

Center to test on 9/14/10 starting at 0800 to 1159 and Grapeland, starting at 9/17/10 from 0800 to 1159 hrs. Please forward a switching order request to strip one of Centers 66kv busses north or south. Vista, Does CB 501 being open require a switching order to be submitted? If so, please do.

Cause code 9998 (black start testing) was not on the list, so had to settle on cause code 9590.

6/11/10

On Thursday June 10, 2010, the following Non-public Transmission Function Information was inadvertently disclosed to SCE Marketing Function Employees

MAIN CITIES AFFECTED: Tehachapi, Caliente Cause: Skyline fell in to the 66kV line out by Cal Cement - that line section out (windfarm line). Customer owned subs have to inspect and transmission has to patrol before they energize back so we can go back to normal. Vincent S/C involved with coordinating these action items.

1st Relay:
TIME OFF: 06/10/2010 22:10
TIME LOAD STARTED TO BE RESTORED: 06/10/2010 22:10:30
TIME ALL LOAD RESTORED: 06/10/2010 22:10:30

2nd Relay:
TIME OFF: 06/10/2010 22:18
TIME LOAD STARTED TO BE RESTORED: 06/10/2010 22:28
Current Status --
T/M restored all power to residential customers.

  • Northwind dead
    Pinwheel and Gust CBs open
  • Midwind dead
    Puff being carried by the Keene. Tempest still open.
  • Southwind dead

ESTIMATED TOTAL CUSTOMERS: 14,602 customers
TOTAL SUBSTATIONS: 8
TOTAL CIRCUITS: 17

SUBSTATIONS/CUSTOMER COUNT

Breeze 12kV Substation
Slump – 0 (Wind generation)
Slurry – 0 (Wind Generation)
Chinook – 3875
Sirocco – 1743

Loraine 12kV Substation
Zenda - 317

Walker Basin 12kV Substation
Rankin- 94

Havilah 66/12KV Substation
Flying D 12 KV – 437
Tee Vee 12 KV – 9

Cummings 12kV Substation
Caliente - 2148
Cuddeback - 3160
Mettler - 1946

Southwind 12kV Substation
Sancho - 1
Quixote - 0

Northwind 12kV Substation
Gust - 840
Pinwheel- 3

Midwind 12kV Substation
Tempest - 1
Puff - 28

1/16/09

On Friday, January 16, 2009, the following nonpublic transmission function information was improperly disclosed to SCE marketing function employees.

SCE Outage Request Item: VIS7128

Outage Date:  1/22/2009
Return Date:  1/22/2009
Substation:  Grapeland
Voltage:  66
Equipment:  Etiwanda-Ameron-Grapeland-Pipe 66 kV Line
Scheduled:  Thu 0800-0900
Emer. Return:  15 min.

Outage Detail:
 
Etiwanda-Ameron-Pipe 66 kV CB bypassed
Trip test 66 kV CB via HCB relay
 
Grapeland Peaker unit unavailable for duration
 
Etiwanda-Ameron-Grapeland-Pipe 66 kV Line HCB relay 
previously nonautomatic  VIS5317
 
Etiwanda Sub 7A Bank 220/66 kV cleared with Ameron
Sub being carried via Etiwanda-Grapeland-Pipe 66 kV
Line and Ameron furnace off   VIS7070
 

08/11/08

Update: the information in the 8/08/08 posting below was sent to ES&M by a non-SCE affiliated entity.

08/08/08

On Friday, August 8, 2008, the following nonpublic transmission information was improperly disclosed to employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management.

4/23/2008

Last night [April 22, 2008] at approximately 4:38 PM MST, the 500/345kV bank in the Four Corners 500kV Switchyard experienced a failure of the transformer banks tertiary winding connections. The cause has not been determined at this time. Crews are currently disconnecting the three single phase transformers that form this transformer bank. There is one single phase spare transformer available for service. Oil samples are being collected for analysis. The transformers will be Dobled and SFRA tested sometime this evening.

If no more than one transformer is damaged, the transformer connections will be reinstalled and the bank will be returned to service. This disconnecting, testing, reconnecting, and return to service could be completed within three to five days, depending on conditions found during the inspections and testing.

 

If more than one transformer is damaged, the Moenkopi Line will not be in service until Unit 5 is returned to service, on or about May 28th. The Moenkopi line is capable of carrying all of the 755 MW output of Unit 5.

4/7/2008

On Monday, April 7, 2008, the following nonpublic transmission information was improperly disclosed to an employee of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management. 

At the Scoping Meeting for the [redacted*] Phase 1 (TOT [redacted*]) and Phase 2 (TOT[redacted*]) [redacted*] determined that it would prefer to interconnect its Phase 1 Project to the Cottonwood-Savage 115 kV line. As a result, [redacted*] has elected to withdraw its TOT Application for interconnection with CAISO (TOT [redacted*]) and resubmit its WDAT Application for the same project (WDT [redacted*]) with SCE.

Please continue to use the existing Application Phase Work Order Number [redacted*] for WDT [redacted*]. If you have already incurred costs associated with TOT [redacted*], please apply these charges to the WDT [redacted*] WO Number.

* The redacted information contains confidential customer related information.

11/16/2007

On Friday, November 16, 2007, the following non-public transmission information was improperly disclosed to employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management.

There is coordination between the Alberhill 500/115 kV project and the Lake Elsinore Advanced Storage (LEAPS) project. The location of LEAPS's Lee Lake substation was of concern because of the size of the proposed parcel by LEAPS. The interconnection of LEAPS into Alberhill 500/115 kV project would consist of the addition of one position to the Alberhill switch rack.

The system needs associated with Nevada Hydro's 500 kV transmission line were not studied.

SCE's Interconnection System Impact Study for LEAPS evaluated the following scenarios: Telega – Escondido/ Valley – Serrano (TE/VS) transmission line only (natural flow); 500 MW into SCE's System; 500 MW into SDG&E's system; 600 MW of load into SCE's system; and 600 MW of load into SDG&E's system

The system reliability and need for Nevada Hydro was not studied.
SCE's Transmission and Interconnection Planning group has proceeded with its annual Expansion Plan study with out the TE/VS and/or LEAPS project and has taken the necessary steps to assure reliable service to the Lake Elsinore / San Jacinto region with its proposed Alberhill 500/115 kV project.  Method of service for the Alberhill 500/115 kV substation does not consider the TE/VS and/or LEAPS project.        

The Alberhill 500/115 kV project details:

  • Up to 7-500 kV positions
  • 4 –560 MVA 500/115 kV Transformer banks
  • Up to 9 115 kV positions

Proposed to pick-up approximately 288 MW.

10/16/2007

On Tuesday, October 16, 2007, the following non-public transmission information was improperly disclosed to several employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management.

Nevada Hydro submitted an interconnection application with the California ISO to interconnect the 500 MW Lake Elsinore Advance Pump Storage ("LEAPS") project to SCE's Valley-Serrano 500 kV line and the San Diego Gas & Electric Company near Camp Pendleton.

A new interconnection substation is needed so that the LEAPS project can interconnect to SCE's electrical system, whereby the Valley-Serrano 500 kV line will be looped into the new substation. Also, several facility upgrades on SCE's system are required to accommodate the LEAPS project. The substation and upgrades must be included in the Nevada Hydro Environmental Impact Report (EIR). The new substation will basically be SCE's proposed Alberhill substation and may be relocated to the proposed Nevada Hydro 500 kV substation site.

4/18/2007

On Wednesday, April 18, 2007, the following non-public transmission information was improperly disclosed to several employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management.

Coincident A-Bank Load Forecast (MW) Substation Load and Large Customer Load (1 in 10 Year Heat Wave) (PDF)

1/29/2007

On Wednesday, April 18, 2007, the following non-public transmission information was improperly disclosed to several employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management.

Coincident A-Bank Load Forecast (MW) Substation Load and Large Customer Load (1 in 2 Year Heat Wave) (PDF)

2/7/2007

On February 7, 2007, the following non-public transmission information was inadvertently disclosed to an employee of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management:

"The four 230KV lines between Moorpark Substation and Reliant Energy's Ormond Beach Generating Station are Radial Lines as shown on the attached single line diagram. As indicated on the color index for the single lines - Cyan colored lines are Radial Lines not under the CAISO control and are therefore excluded from the TAC."

The line single-line diagram referenced above cannot be posted because it contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) and disclosure would therefore raise security concerns.

1/29/2007

On Friday, January 26, 2007, the following non-public transmission information was inadvertently disclosed to several employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management.

Coincident A-Bank Load Forecast (MW) Substation Load and Large Customer Load (1 in 2 Year Heat Wave) (PDF)

12/14/2006

On December 14, 2006, the following non-public transmission information was inadvertently disclosed to several employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management:

"It looks like APS will not have replacement bushings installed for the 1AA 345/500kv transformers [at Four Corners] until May or June of 2007."

11/14/2006

On November 14, 2006, the following non-public transmission information was inadvertently disclosed to several employees of SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply & Management:

  • New interconnection agreements will be required
    • PPSA I is under Rule 21
    • PPSA II is FERC jurisdictional
    • Currently in CAISO transmission queue
  • Some transmission issues
    • PPSA I — short circuit duty is likely and no problems are anticipated
    • PPSA II — regular FERC process and upgrades are likely to be required for most, if not all of contract output (Phase III of Tehachapi)
    • PPSA I — short circuit duty and power flow are both expected and some constraints may arise
    • PPSA II — regular FERC process and upgrades are likely to be required for all contract output (Phase III of Tehachapi)

10/18/2006

On October 18, 2006, an employee from SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply and Management, received the following information that contained non-public transmission information:

SCE is currently in discussions with a bidder in SCE's RFO regarding a 66KV line that is currently providing service to Can Fibre Substation. On October 16, 2006, SCE held a meeting with the customer taking service from the Can Fibre Substation, Inland Empire Truss Inc.

10/10/2006

On October 10, 2006, employees from SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply, and Management received non-public transmission information regarding an affiliated entity who is a bidder in SCE's RFO and has provided written consent for such disclosure. This information was provided simultaneously to ES&M and the affiliated entity bidder in the same manner as such information has been provided to other bidders in SCE's RFO who have provided written consent. This information has not been shared with employees in ES&M's trading group.

9/25/2006

On September 25, 2006, an employee from SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply and Management, received the following information that contained non-public transmission information:

Outage Date:  10/7/2006
Return Date:  10/7/2006
Substation:  San Bernardino
Voltage:  220
Equipment:  220 kV Station Cold Wash by Procedure 9/14/06
Scheduled:  Sat 0300-1600
Emer. Return:  1 hr.

Outage Detail
220 kV busses, banks, capacitor & lines deenergized 2A &3A Bank 220/66 kV 250 MVA each 4A Bank 220/66 kV 280 MVA  
2A Bank 220/66 kV and South 220 kV Bus deenergized with hot side discs open 0530-0730
3A Bank 220/66 kV, North 220 kV Bus and No. 3 220 kV Capacitor de-energized w/hot side discs open 0800-1000
Devers-San Bernardino No. 1 220 kV Line deenergized 1000-1100
Etiwanda-San Bernardino 220 kV Line deenergized 1100-1200
San Bernardino-Vista 220 kV Line deenergized 1300-1400
Devers-San Bernardino No. 2 220 kV Line deenergized 1400-1500
4A Bank 220/66 kV deenergized 1500-1600

9/5/2006

On September 5, 2006, an employee from SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply and Management, received the following message via email that contained non-public transmission information, "I am chasing down the possibility of changing out all of the 66 breakers at Center Substation."

8/11/2006

August 11, 2006: On the evening of August 10, 2006, personnel from SCE's internal marketing group, Energy Supply and Management, received the following nonpublic transmission information:

SCE is not aware of any scheduled outages of major transmission facilities during the next 30 days that would necessitate a reduction in import capability. It may be desirable or necessary to plan brief transmission outages during this period to permit maintenance and similar routine work to be completed; however, such outages would be of short duration and could easily be scheduled to occur in off-peak hours or other suitable timeframes, based on SCE and CAISO system requirements.

A special concern during periods of prolonged heat that should also be mentioned is the potential for wildfires. Southern and Central California remain at high risk of fires, which could adversely impact transmission capability, but cannot be effectively forecast. Only yesterday (August 9th), the National Weather Service issued a Red Flag Warning for Los Angeles County because of high fire risk.

3/1/2006

On March 1, 2006, the following transmission information was disclosed to an employee of ES&M, SCE's internal marketing affiliate.

Transmission Assumptions: SCE assumes that there will be some increases and decreases to the "Net Interchange" capacity values due to the addition of the series capacitors being installed on the SWPL and DPV#1 transmission lines, and due to the shutdown of the Mohave Generating Station ("Mohave"). While the Mohave shutdown will definitely reduce the SCIT limits, no final determinations of the magnitude of such limitations have been made at this time. SCE anticipates a potential reduction in SCIT due to the Mohave can range between 100 MW and 800 MW depending on system conditions. Whereas there may be some transmission equipment or grid modifications that could resolve some of this limitation, no firm technical analysis of such transmission equipment nor modifications were presently available on which to base a firm estimate of the loss of import capability. In addition, it was assumed that due to the installation of the series capacitors, some additional capacity from the Southwest would be available to serve the peak load for the years 2006 – 2008. The additional import capacity support was not added beyond 2008, since SCE projects that on-peak generation surpluses may no longer be available beyond 2008.

Imports: After modifying the data to incorporate the effects of SCIT limits due to the series capacitor additions and the Mohave shutdown in 2006, the import limits were basically held constant. [Table 1, Line 6]. In the CEC Staff's September 2005 analysis of expected 2006 conditions it was assumed that there was 400 MW of zonal transmission limitations under expected operating conditions and an additional 550 MW of zonal limitations under adverse conditions. The CEC has subsequently lowered these limits to 400 MW in their December 8, 2005 analysis. SCE understands that these values came from analysis at the CAISO. SCE has therefore used the CEC estimates in this analysis and has not made any changes in the future since it does not know the basis for the CAISO's analysis.

3/1/2006

On March 1, 2006, the following statement regarding transmission information was disclosed to an employee of ES&M, SCE's internal marketing affiliate.

"They [California Energy Commission, CEC] may show more imports by assuming that Blythe 2 is finished and has transmission (this might increase imports by 300 - 500 MW)."

2/23/06

On February 23, 2006, the following transmission information was disclosed to an employee of Midwest Generation, a Southern California Edison energy affiliate.

Transmission Assumptions: SCE assumes that there will be some increases and decreases to the "Net Interchange" capacity values due to the addition of the series capacitors being installed on the SWPL and DPV#1 transmission lines, and due to the shutdown of the Mohave Generating Station ("Mohave"). While the Mohave shutdown will definitely reduce the SCIT limits, no final determinations of the magnitude of such limitations have been made at this time. SCE anticipates a potential reduction in SCIT due to the Mohave can range between 100 MW and 800 MW depending on system conditions. Whereas there may be some transmission equipment or grid modifications that could resolve some of this limitation, no firm technical analysis of such transmission equipment nor modifications were presently available on which to base a firm estimate of the loss of import capability. In addition, it was assumed that due to the installation of the series capacitors, some additional capacity from the Southwest would be available to serve the peak load for the years 2006 – 2008. The additional import capacity support was not added beyond 2008, since SCE projects that on-peak generation surpluses may no longer be available beyond 2008.

Imports: After modifying the data to incorporate the effects of SCIT limits due to the series capacitor additions and the Mohave shutdown in 2006, the import limits were basically held constant. [Table 1, Line 6]. In the CEC Staff's September 2005 analysis of expected 2006 conditions it was assumed that there was 400 MW of zonal transmission limitations under expected operating conditions and an additional 550 MW of zonal limitations under adverse conditions. The CEC has subsequently lowered these limits to 400 MW in their December 8, 2005 analysis. SCE understands that these values came from analysis at the CAISO. SCE has therefore used the CEC estimates in this analysis and has not made any changes in the future since it does not know the basis for the CAISO's analysis.

1/05/06

On January 5, 2006, the following transmission information was disclosed to certain employees of ES&M, SCE's internal marketing group.

Issue:

  • Transmission constraints
  • SCE position: Use CAISO assumptions for zonal limitations, including modification of ratings due to changes in generation and transmission projects Near-term changes:
    1. Series Capacitor Project (increases import capability)
    2. Devers Palo Verde #2 (increases import capability)
    3. Mohave shut down (reduces SCIT limits by unknown amount due to reduced inertia)

12/09/05

On December 2, 2005, the following information was sent via e-mail to certain employees of ES&M, SCE's internal marketing affiliate.

SCE assumes that there will be some increases and decreases to net interchange capacity values due to the addition of the series capacitors being installed on the SWPL and DPV#1 transmission lines. In addition, it was assumed that due to the installation of the series capacitors some additional capacity from the Southwest would be available to serve the peak load for the years 2006 – 2008. The additional import capacity support was decreased from 2006 – 2008 was not added beyond 2008. Lastly, no capacity benefits were attributed to the DPV#2 transmission line in any future year.

After the modifications to incorporate the effects of SCIT limits the import limits were basically held constant since there is little data available that can be used to support the assumption that adjoining regions may be adding capacity just to meet the peak requirements of Southern California. SCE has not assumed in any of our recent filings that new transmission lines, or modifications to existing lines, would necessarily allow more imported capacity support at the coincident time of the SP-15 system peak demand. Therefore, any additional capacity support from new transmission lines, or modification of existing lines, will decrease the need for future capacity as shown in this analysis.

In the CEC staff September 2005 analysis of expected 2006 conditions it was assumed that there were 400 MW of zonal transmission limitations under expected operating conditions and an additional 550 MW of zonal limitations under adverse conditions. During the public meeting when this analysis was discussed, the CAISO representative indicated that this level of zonal limitations, 950 MW, appeared to be too high for future years. SCE has lowered the limitations to 400 MW in subsequent years.

Base Case
Projected Reserves for 2005 - 2011 (Megawatts)
Resource Adequacy Panning Conventions 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Net Interchange1

  9,903   9,782   9,656   9,529   9,403   9,403   9,403

1-in-2 Summer Temperature Demand (Normal)2

27,400 27,948 28,507 29,077 29,659 30,252 30,857
Expected Operating Conditions

Zonal Transmission Limitation3

(800) (400) (400) (400) (400) (400) (400)

Notes:

  1. 2005 estimate of the following Net Imports: DC imports 2,000 MW, SW imports 2,900 MW, Imports from NP26 3,000 MW, LADWP Control Area imports 1,000 MW and Dyanmic Resources 1,003 MW. Imports with own reserves highlighted in bold. Includes some capacity fro Series Capacitors in 2006, 2007, and 2008.
  2. Historical peak demand in 2005 escalated at 2.0% in the future.
  3. Estimates provided by CA ISO.

11/18/05

On November 14, 2005, a draft copy of SCE's Comments on the Interagency Task Force on Electricity Competition was inadvertently disclosed to employees of ES&M, SCE's internal marketing group. Section F of the Comments section discusses the need for new transmission investment in California to alleviate congestion and the resulting higher generation costs, and to interconnect remotely located renewable generation. There is a discussion of recent and planned investment in transmission infrastructure in general, and SCE's "plans to invest approximately $1.6 billion in additional transmission infrastructure through 2009." The following specifics were included in the draft:

  • Last December, SCE and LADWP completed the 3100 MW Pacific DC Intertie terminal modernization project between the Pacific Northwest and Southern California. This $118 million upgrade of the southern terminal will extend the life of this major regional intertie facility, allowing continued seasonal power exchanges between our regions for the benefit of our customers.
  • SCE and SDG&E are planning a substantial upgrade to the capacity of our existing 500 kV lines from Arizona to California. The CAISO Board of Governors in June of 2004 approved these upgrades, which, through installation of new series capacitor equipment, will increase the power transfer capability by 500 MW between California and Arizona. This $150 million project is under construction and is expected to be operational by June of 2006.
  • Another major SCE project, currently in the CPUC permitting stage, is the Antelope Transmission Project, which is expected to extend transmission access to remotely located renewable generation resource areas that the State of California has identified as having significant wind generation potential. The CAISO approved the initial phase of this project in July 2004, and permitting applications to the CPUC were submitted in December of 2004 to deliver 1000 MW of new renewable resources. SCE expects this project to be operational in the 2007-2008 timeframe at a cost ranging from $207 to $285 million, depending on the final project scope.
  • Finally, SCE is planning to build a new major regional transmission line between Arizona and California. The Devers-Palo Verde 2 Project is a 230 mile, 500 kV line that will deliver 1200 MW of lower cost energy to California, enhance generation competition, and provide increased operational flexibility. The CAISO Board of Governors approved the need for the project in February 2005, and last week SCE submitted the project licensing application to the CPUC for review. This $680 million project is expected to begin construction in 2006 and be online by 2009

In addition to several other SCE transmission projects which comprise the remainder of the SCE transmission investment plan, SCE is making substantial investments in new substations, transformers, and distribution facilities. These investments are required to handle increasing customer and load growth, and replacement of aging infrastructure installed over 50 years ago.  SCE's overall investment plan for transmission and distribution is $9.2 billion over the 2004-2009 period, over $1.5 billion per year.

11/04/05

On November 1, 2005 the following transmission information discussing the CAISO developed, proposed study methodologies and analysis for input for the CPUC's 2006 resource adequacy procurement cycle and SCE's 2006 transmission Substation Equipment Replacement Program (SERP) was inadvertently disclosed to ES&M employees, SCE's internal marketing affiliate:

The CAISO identified the following sites for SCE Grid Mitigation for Generation Deliverability: 1) Alamitos 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment; 2) Barre 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment; 3) Center 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment; 4) La Fresa 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment; 5) Lighthipe 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment; and 5) Redondo 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment

The CAISO identified the following Grid Mitigation sites for local capacity requirement (LCR) reduction to 4,800 MW: 1) Rio Hondo 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment; 2) Eagle Rock 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment; and 3) Gould 220 kV, Line Termination Equipment.

In addition, in the same communication the following information discussing the RMR to LCR Transition and the SERP Deliverability Project was also disclosed to ES&M:

10/20/05

On October 19, 2005 the following Press Release from the California ISO containing transmission information was disclosed to employees of ES&M, SCE's internal marketing affiliate.

10/12/05

On September 27, 2005 the following transmission information describing SCE's completed and anticipated transmission project application filings at the CPUC was inadvertently disclosed to an ES&M employee, SCE's internal marketing affiliate:

Completed transmission project filings: Viejo Substation, DPV1 Series Capacity, DPV2, and Antelope Phases 1, 2, and 3.

Anticipated applications for PTCs and CPCNs for transmission projects in 2006-2008: Oak Valley, 220/115/12 kV substation; Calpine Inland Empire, 500 kV Gentie; Riverside Public Utility, 220 kV interconnection; Devers-Mirage, 115 kV system upgrade; Ivy Glen, 115/12 kV substation and 115 kV line; Fogarty, 115/12 kV substation; Cross-Valley Loop, 230 kV transmission line; Kimball, 66/12 kV substation; Ritter Ranch, 66/12 kV substation; Tehachapi-Midway, 500 kV line; Riverway, 66/12 kV substation; Heritage, 66/12 kV substation; Tenja, 115/12 kV substation; Porterville, 66/12 kV substation; Etiwanda-Genamic, 66 kV line reconductor; Vincent-Mira Loma, 500 kV line; Triton, 115/12 kV substation; and Pacificenter, 66/12 kV substation

10/5/05

On October 4, 2005, the following transmission information was inadvertently disclosed to an employee of ES&M, SCE's internal energy marketing unit: "Path 15 has been upgraded to 500."

9/20/05

On September 13, 2005 the following information was e-mailed to an employee of ES&M, SCE's internal energy marketing unit: "Testimony of Pedro Pizarro
Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee"

9/15/05

On August 25, 2005, the following diagram was forwarded to an individual in ES&M via e-mail.

9/13/05

On August 23, 2005, the following information was posted on SCE's intranet website:

DPV1 : SCE's series capacitors have been ordered and are on schedule for June 1, 2006 operating date. Other required series capacitors have not been ordered. Static VAR compensator (SVC) operating date has been delayed from June 1, 2006 to Sept. 1, 2006. The SVC provides the other portion of the DPV line uprate (independent of the series capacitor uprate).

DPV2 : SCE conducted a site tour of the DPV2 line route with CPUC staff on June 16, 2005.

8/26/05

In a Market Design Team Meeting on August 15, an employee from RP&A and an employee from TDBU both mentioned that TransElect has an investment interest in Path 15. There was no discussion beyond simply a mention by both individuals.

In a Capacity Markets Meeting on August 15, an employee in TDBU stated "We didn't violate SCIT or South-of-Lugo but we still had a collapse."

8/04/05

On July 25, 2005, the following transmission information was inadvertently e-mailed to an employee of ES&M, SCE's internal energy marketing unit:

  • DPV1: CAISO expected to finalize outage plans by August based on SDG&E and SCE recommendations and stakeholder input. Once outage plan approved and receipt of Static VAR System bid, construction schedule will be finalized.
  • DPV2: Deficiency notice received from CPUC in May 2005; SCE will respond by July 2005. Site tour of DPV2 line route was completed on June 16, 2005.
  • Antelope: CPUC and Angeles National Forest held the first scoping meeting for Segment 1 on June 29. On July 1, FERC issued its decision on SCE's Petition for Declaratory Order granting our request on Segments 1 & 2, and denying our proposal on Segment 3.

7/25/05

On July 25, 2005, several employees of ES&M, SCE's internal marketing group, inadvertently received the following transmission information:

"SCE is doubling its investment in transmission to facilitate needed access to power in other areas and relieve congestion... SCE [is] making significant investments in the replacement of SCE's aging distribution infrastructure."

7/18/05

On Monday, July 18, 2005, the following transmission information was disclosed to employees of ES&M, SCE's internal marketing group through SCE's internal website. http://www.sce.com/AboutSCE/Regulatory/fercsoc/EdisonNews/dvp2.htm

7/1/05

On July 1, 2005, two ES&M employees inadvertently received an e-mail that contained the following statement:

"In California, the CAISO has recently reported that between 1998 through 2004, it approved 337 transmission projects with a total capital investment value of $3.32 Billion. In 2005, the CAISO approved two major SCE transmission projects, with a total capital investment value of approximately $810 Million [DPV2 and Rancho Vista]. SCE alone has plans to invest approximately $1.6 billion in new transmission projects through 2009."

6/28/05

On June 28, during a meeting at which two ES&M employees were present, an employee in SCE's Regulatory Policy and Affairs group made a statement to the effect, "We've been using the Mohave line on a regular basis for ages."

5/16/05

During the week of May 16–23, employees of SCE's internal marketing group, ES&M, inadvertently received drafts of a CPUC filing that contained the following transmission information:

"As set forth in Appendix J of the RFO (Exhibit SCE-2), SCE offers two substations as potential sites for the development of small peaking generators. Factors used in selecting these sites included:

  1. Low congestion areas or where peakers will be beneficial because of the presence of large loads;
  2. Substations have sufficient short circuit duty margin to accommodate additional generation;
  3. Land outside the substation fences do not have existing lease agreements;
  4. Land available inside and/or outside the substation fences is at least two acres;
  5. Land is not required for future transmission or distribution expansion plan needs; and
  6. Substation arrangement can provide separate entrance and road access to the site.

Sellers, however, are free to, and encouraged to, propose other sites for the development of their facilities, especially larger facilities that the substation sites would not accommodate."

5/12/05

On May 12, 2005, two ES&M employees received an e-mail from SCE which noted that Kern River Cogeneration Company has an Interconnection Application and requests an Interconnection Agreement with a term of ten years.

4/1/05

During a meeting on March 23, 2005 that included certain employees from SCE's internal Marketing Affiliate, in response to a statement by an ES&M employee that he had heard that in a few years there were expected to be some 18,000 MW of wind generation in California, an SCE employee stated that SCE's Manager of Transmission and Interconnection planning was already building for 4,000 MW.

3/24/05

On March 24, 2005, an ES&M employee received an e-mail which stated," The CEC indicated that Pastoria Phase 1 (240 MW) was going to be delayed at least one month due to delays in the reconductoring of the Pastoria-Bailey line and that there were potential problems with integrating Phase 2 (480 MW) due to other synchronization issues."

2/18/05

On February 10, 2005, an employee of SCE's Energy Supply & Management may have overheard another SCE employee state that he had heard that, "The Cal ISO has found another 1,000 megawatts of import capacity."

2/17/05

On February 4, 2005, one employee of SCE's Energy Supply & Management unit received an e-mail which included the following draft data:

Total Branch Group Allocation Methodology
SCE share of total Import Capability
= 8,004 MW * 42% * 86% = 2,891 MW.
SCE Share of CAISO Proposed Allocateable Capacity Potential SCE Path Specific Import Deficiency
- (10)
119 (381)
518 (75)
143 (382)
399 (311)
- (12)
15
(0)
58 43
1,252 (1,128)
1,639
2,891

2/11/05

On February 8, 2005, eight employees of SCE's Energy Supply & Management unit received an e-mail which included the following statements:

"For example, beyond the resources it is securing for its own bundled customers, SCE has identified potential incremental resource options to support overall SP15 reliability (575-775 MW "high probability" and 75-1000 MW "extraordinary" resources)"

"CAISO is evaluating the potential increase in transfer capability of Path 26 (from 3,700 to 4,000 MW) — High probability of occurring"

1/6/05

On December 20, 2004 an e-mail was sent by an employee of the Transmission Provider to an employee of its Energy and Marketing Affiliate which contained the following assertions:

The City of Corona's Cleargen Power Plant and city load do not directly connect to the ISO Grid.

The Cleargen Power Plant and the City's primary loads (Crossing, Point and Dos Logos) are not physically interconnected. The loads are disbursed throughout the City and are electrically independent from each other, and are dependent upon the ISO grid to provide reliable transmission service. These primary loads are interconnected at three electrically separate 12kV points of interconnection. Cleargen and the biosolid load are interconnected at 66kV.

1/4/05

On January 4, 2005, a draft document containing the following language was forwarded to certain employees of SCE's Marketing Affiliate. SCE does not make any representations regarding the accuracy of this information.

"Footnote 18 discusses two sets of facilities — COTP and the "Mohave-Eldorado line" — significant portions of which are owned by non-PTOs. SCE certainly does not provide transmission service, under an ETC or otherwise, to its Mohave'Eldorado co-owners (the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), the Nevada Power Company (NPC) and the Salt River Project (SRP)) over the portions of the Mohave-Eldorado line that they themselves own. [FN1] Likewise, the non-PTO COTP Participants are not provided transmission service over their very own shares of COTP by any PTO. Both the Mohave-Eldorado non-PTO owners and non-PTO COTP Participants have what the CAISO calls Transmission Ownership Rights (TORs). . . . the portions of these facilities that are in the CAISO control area but owned by non-PTOs are "encumbered" by TORs, not by ETCs. . . .

"[M]any COTP Participants, unlike LADWP, NPC, and SRP have load or demand in the CAISO Control Area. . . .

"Four entities own the Mohave-Eldorado transmission facilities and the capacity of those facilities are allocated among them based on their ownership interests. While the co-owners have a right to use each other's capacity under certain exceptional circumstances, as a general matter the non-PTO owners hold an ownership interest in the facilities and have the right to use their share of the facilities as owners, not "holders of existing rights."

"FN1:  . . . SCE does allow the co-owners to use SCE's facilities under certain operating conditions, which usage is an ETC usage."

11/18/2004

On November 18, 2004, an e-mail which may be considered to include prohibited disclosures was inadvertently sent to an SCE employee at an SCE Energy and Marketing Affiliate. This e-mail contained the following information.

Eurus Energy America Corporation has requested amendments to its Interconnection Facilities agreement with SCE. The requested amendments seek a change to the Sagebrush interconnection point from the existing Westwind Substation to a new, plant-specific OASIS Substation. In addition, they request that the Eurus Oasis Project be allowed to use the existing Westwind Substation 230 kV line protection on a temporary basis (until at least August 1st, 2005), until the permanent protection facilities can be installed at Oasis Substation (and, as necessary, at Vincent Substation). To implement this arrangement, the customer would use relays to do the following: (i) Wire Westwind transfer trip relay output to trip the Oasis 230 kV Main circuit breaker; and (ii) Wire a breaker failure contact, monitoring the Oasis 230 kV Main circuit breaker, to key the existing Westwind transmitter to trip the Vincent feeder.

SCE notes that Eurus is making this request because they want to meet a 12/15/2004 in-service date for the temporary connection. An individual in SCE's Planning department has stated that the change of point of interconnection has no impact to SCE's electrical system.

Another individual in SCE's planning department notes that the temporary connection will be permissible (from a protection point of view) provided the following item, among others, is completed:

They must install a breaker failure detection relay on their 230kV breaker. Any relays that trip the 230kV breaker must initiate the new breaker failure relay. If the breaker fails to open after a time delay, about 10 cycles, the breaker failure relay will provide an output to key the Westwind transmitter to transfer trip to Vincent. It is also stated that SCE needs to make sure that the tap does not attenuate/interfere with the existing power line carrier channels for either the Sagebrush or the Westwind transfer trips.

The individual also states that the permanent protection interconnection will require the installation of a new direct transfer trip scheme dedicated to Oasis along with the removal of the temporary arrangement above. Also, it is stated that if Oasis Power Partners moves their point of interconnection from the 230kV bus at Westwind to the 230kV line, they will need to add some protective relay elements at their interconnection circuit breaker. These protection elements are similar to what is installed at Westwind and Wilderness 220kV circuit breakers for their 230kV interconnection.

It is further stated that Vincent will key direct transfer trip to Oasis, as it does to Westwind and Wilderness, for any 280kV line relay operation and for both breakers open at Vincent. The open breaker keying is required to eliminate possible exposure of the line equipment at Vincent. The relay operation keying speeds de-energization of the line for faster fault clearing. Westwind and Wilderness have over-undervoltage and over/underfrequency relays connected to 230kV potential to trip for abnormal conditions. Oasis Power Partners should have similar functions available in their relaying packages. An instantaneous overvoltage relay is a must.

It is also stated that studies need to be performed to determine whether the new line tap will cause excessive attenuation of the existing transfer trips. These studies would be required regardless of Oasis' choice of transfer trip channel. The length or location of the tap may cause a reflected wave that could effect the signal levels at Westwind, Wilderness and Vincent.

10/21/04

An unredacted draft of SCE's MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER PROTEST AND ANSWER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY TO THE PROTEST AND MOTIONS TO REJECT OF THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES STATE WATER PROJECT, FERC Docket ER04-1209, was inadvertently sent by SCE's law department to an employee in SCE's marketing unit, Energy Supply and Management (ES&M) for review prior to filing. While the transmission information in the unredacted draft was originally provided by this ES&M employee, SCE believes that returning the document to the ES&M employee without redacting the transmission information was a violation of SCE's FERC Standards of Conduct Procedures.

LAR_Answer_to_Protest.doc (Word)

 Sample of FERC Program Log Sheet






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