

*Southern California Edison*  
*2025-WMPs – 2025-WMPs*

**DATA REQUEST SET CalAdvocates-SCE-2025WMP-08**

**To: Cal Advocates**  
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**Job Title: Senior Manager**  
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**Response Date: 4/19/2024**

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**Question 06:**

Your WMP Update at p. 46 states

Mitigations are not deployed by developing a ranking of “best to worst” and then deploying mitigations based on such a ranking in a linear fashion of going down a list. Instead, SCE takes a portfolio approach to reduce the risk of wildfire PSPS. Individual locations receive a portfolio combination of mitigations...

- a) Please explain how SCE performs its mitigation selection and scoping of each of the circuits in its Table 1-1 (Top 5% Ignition Risk Circuits/Segments/Spans) and Table 1-2 (Top 5% PSPS Risk Circuits/Segments/Spans).
- b) Please explain if you are considering any specific PSPS risk mitigations for the circuits in Table 1-2.
- c) If specific PSPS risk mitigations are not planned on the circuits in Table 1-2, please provide SCE’s evaluation of why such mitigations would not be possible.

**Response to Question 06:**

*a) Please explain how SCE performs its mitigation selection and scoping of each of the circuits in its Table 1-1 (Top 5% Ignition Risk Circuits/Segments/Spans) and Table 1-2 (Top 5% PSPS Risk Circuits/Segments/Spans).*

SCE’s mitigation selection and scoping is based on its Integrated Wildfire Mitigation Strategy (IWMS). Table 1-1 and Table 1-2 were produced as required by the 2025 WMP Update guidelines, and per the specific requirements defined by OEIS. As such, the presence (or lack of presence) of a circuit in either table should not be seen as the basis of how mitigations might be selected.

*b) Please explain if you are considering any specific PSPS risk mitigations for the circuits in Table 1-2.*

As SCE stated in its response to Question 1 of the data request set CalAdvocates-SCE-2025WMP-06, the calculation of overall PSPS risk for the WMP (e.g. Table 1-2) is better understood as a kind of “general” or “static” PSPS risk as it is based on overall conditions, using the past 10 years of weather data, without reference to a specific point in time of potential PSPS events in the future. This calculation of PSPS risk should not be confused with how SCE would evaluate PSPS de-energization decisions in the short-term, which includes factors such as current wind speeds and vegetation conditions. It is also not the same as a historical look at actual PSPS de-energizations. In terms of how SCE uses PSPS risk to inform mitigation decisions, PSPS risk—expressed as a

function of wind speeds—is used as a criteria in both Severe Risk Areas (SRA) and High Consequence Areas (HCA). SRA and HCA are the two highest tiers of SCE’s IWMS Tranches (see SCE’s 2023-2025 WMP, page 112).

SCE also addresses PSPS risk through its WMP Initiative SH-5, Remote Controlled Automatic Reclosers Settings Update. This initiative, which is described on page 271 of SCE’s 2023-2025 WMP, uses historical PSPS activations to inform scope for the following program year.

With the understanding of those clarifications provided above, namely that Table 1-2 should not be understood as the basis for SCE’s PSPS mitigation strategy, SCE has provided an attachment, “*CalAdvocates-SCE-2025WMP-08-06.xlsx*” to this response that indicates mitigation status for the circuits in Table 1-2. SCE provides notes for circuits that had PSPS de-energizations but no PSPS scope developed.

*c) If specific PSPS risk mitigations are not planned on the circuits in Table 1-2, please provide SCE’s evaluation of why such mitigations would not be possible.*

Please see the response to part b) above.